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STATE-BY-STATE DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING
SURVEY
MORGAN, LEWIS & BoCKlus*
INTRODUCTION
The use of alcohol and drugs is a significant economic and social
problem affecting both public and private employers. The federal
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has estimated that drug
abuse costs United States industry between $60 billion and $100
billion a year. According to the Administrator of the DEA, drug
abusers lose three times as much time from work as nonabusers
and have four times as many accidents. Additionally, the DEA has
reported that seventy airline pilots are currently under drug treat-
ment without the knowledge of their employers; one-third of bus
drivers in a major city tested positive for drug use; thirty percent
of applicants answering advertisements to replace striking workers
in another city tested positive for drug use; and substance abuse
has caused forty-eight train wrecks in the past ten years. DAILY
LABOR REPORT, Feb. 19, 1990, at A-8.
In recognition of this substance abuse problem in the workplace,
many employers have adopted drug-testing policies and programs,
and in some instances have taken adverse employment action
against employees who test positive for drug and alcohol use or
who exhibit substance-abuse problems while in the workplace.
Although such actions are obviously defensible from a business
standpoint, both drug testing and the imposition of discipline against
employees for substance abuse raise significant legal concerns about
which employers should be aware.
In addition, employees in the private sector who have challenged
drug testing have found increasing success under common law
theories. The most commonly invoked protections are wrongful
discharge and tort actions for invasion of privacy, defamation, and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. These
theories and their relative acceptance vary from state to state,
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and have fostered an increasing number of court decisions at the
state level.
Finally, many states have addressed the use of adverse employ-
ment action against substance abusers through their handicap
discrimination laws. Administrative and court decisions under those
laws have interpreted the definition of "handicap" or "disability"
under various state statutes to include alcoholism or drug addiction.
Employees suffering from alcoholism or drug addiction are entitled
"to statutory protections otherwise unavailable in the wor1kplace.
The purpose of this Survey is to provide a state-by-state sum-
mary of the various statutory, regulatory, constitutional, and com-
mon law developments that affect drug testing and the treatment
of substance abusers in the workplace. Of course, this Survey is
only a starting point for analyzing problems involving drug abuse
in the workplace. The research reflected in this Survey is current
through March 15, 1991. Moreover, the changing nature of the
legal landscape in this area should caution one against relying upon
this Survey without further in-depth research in the particular
state in which the issue arises.
This Survey does not address the impact of federal law on drug
testing and the treatment of substance abusers in the workplace.
Several federal statutes and regulations apply to this area, includ-
ing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,1 and the drug-testing regu-
lations of the Federal Department of Transportation,2 Federal
Aviation Administration,3 Federal Highway Administration, 4 Fed-
eral Railroad Administrations,5 United States Coast Guard,6 the
Urban Mass Transportation Administration,7 and the Research and
Special Programs Administration. 8 Additionally, public employees
may enjoy certain protections under the United States Constitution.
Because the various federal statutes and regulations may not
completely preempt all state laws relating to substance abuse and
testing in the employment context, there may be considerable
overlap between the state laws discussed in this Survey and the
various federal requirements and restrictions. The purpose of this
Survey is to highlight the various obligations, restrictions, and
1. 21 U.S.C. SS 1501-1509 (1988).
2. 14 C.F.R. S 121 app. 1 (1990)
3. 14 C.F.R. S 65.46 (1990).
4. 49 C.F.R. S 40.3 (1990).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 49 C.F.R. S 653.1 (1990).
8. 49 C.F.R. S 199.1 (1990).
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litigation risks imposed on employers by those state statutes,
regulations, and court decisions.
ALABAmA
Handicap Discrimination
An Alabama statute prohibits discrimination against "the visually
handicapped and the otherwise physically disabled" in employment
"in the state service, the service of the political subdivisions of the
state, in the public schools and in all other employment supported
in whole or in part by public funds." Ala. Code § 21-7-8 (1990). No
cases addressing whether alcoholism or drug addiction constitute
physical disabilities within the meaning of the statute have been
found.
ALASKA
Handicap Discrimination
The Alaska state legislature enacted a statute that prohibits
private employers from discriminating on the basis of an indivi-
dual's physical or mental disability. Alaska Stat. § 18.80.210 (1990).
The statute does not expressly address the status of alcohol or
drug abuse as a disability. Id. S 18.80.300(13), (16)-(17).
Drug Testing
In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska
1989), an employer discharged two employees for refusing to submit
to drug testing. Id. at 1126. One of the discharged employees
voluntarily provided a urine sample during a physical examination
but was unaware that the lab would screen it for drugs. Id. at
1125. After the screening revealed drug use, the employer sus-
pended the employee and required him to submit to further testing
before returning to work. Id. at 1126. The other employee was
aware of the testing program but refused to participate in it. Id.
Both employees brought claims against their former employer for
violation of their state constitutional rights to privacy, common
law invasion of privacy, wrongful termination, and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 1126-27.
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the Alaska Constitution
prohibited only certain state action and did not provide a cause of
action against the private employer based on an alleged invasion
1991]
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of privacy. Id. at 1130. Because the employees presented no evi-
dence of "an unreasonable manner of intrusion[] or intrusion for
an unwarranted purpose," the court rejected their common law
invasion of privacy claims. Id. at 1137-38. Specifically, the court
found that the fact that one employee voluntarily provided a urine
sample indicated that the manner of the testing was not "unrea-
sonable" and that the employees' later refusals to submit to testing
prevented further alleged intrusions from occurring. Id.
Although the court recognized Alaska's public policy in favor of
protecting the privacy of employees, this policy failed to overcome
the employer's paramount concerns for safety. Id. at 1132-36. The
court explained that an employer's power to test employees has
the following two limitations: (1) the tests "must be conducted at
a time reasonably contemporaneous with the employee's work time"
and (2) the employer must provide the employee notice of the drug-
testing policy. Id. at 1136-37. With these requirements in mind, the
court remanded the case for reconsideration of the breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim brought by
the employee who, without notice of the drug policy, received a
suspension for testing positive. Id. at 1137.
ARIZONA
Handicap Discrimination
An Arizona statute prohibits discrimination in employment on
the basis of a handicap. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1461(4)(a) (1985).
Another statute, however, specifically excludes "any impairment
caused by current or recent use of alcohol or drugs" from the
definition of the term "handicap." Id. 5 41-1463(B).
Drug Testing
Arizona requires that a school transportation employee submit
to drug and alcohol testing if the employee's supervisor "has
probable cause [to believe] that the employee's job performance
has been impaired" through drug or alcohol abuse. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. S 15-513(A) (1990).
In response to an inquiry from a private employer about the
legality of requiring AIDS testing as a condition of employment,
the Arizona Attorney General stated, "[It appears that medical
testing by private employers will be allowed unless there is inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress by means of extreme and
outrageous conduct." 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. Ariz. 251 (1987).
[Vol. 33:189
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ARKANSAS
Handicap Discrimination
The state law that prohibits handicap discrimination, Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 20-14-301(a), (b) (1990), extends only to those employees in
state or state-funded service; it does not address the rights of
handicapped persons in private employment. No case law discussing
whether drug or alcohol addiction constitutes a "handicap" under
the statute has been found.
Unemployment Compensation
Arkansas law specifically provides that an employee discharged
from work for being under the influence of "intoxicants, including
a controlled substance," is disqualified from receiving benefits. Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 11-10-514(b) (Supp. 1990).
In addition, the Arkansas Court of Appeals has determined that
an employee's positive drug test constitutes "misconduct" under
the statute, disqualifying the employee from receiving unemploy-
ment compensation. Grace Drilling Co. v. Director of Labor, 790
S.W.2d 907, 908 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990).
CALIFORNIA
Handicap Discrimination
Although California law contains broad prohibitions against hand-
icap discrimination, see Cal. Gov't Code S 12940 (West 1991), state
regulations specifically provide that drug or alcohol addiction is
not a handicap. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 7293.6(a)(4) (1991).
The California Labor Code provides that every private employer
regularly employing twenty-five or more employees shall reasona-
bly accommodate any employee who wishes to enter and participate
voluntarily in an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program, "unless
the accommodation would impose undue hardship on the employer."
Cal. Lab. Code § 1025 (West 1989). Employers must make "reason-
able efforts to safeguard the privacy" of employees enrolled in
alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs. Id. § 1026. Employers do
not have to provide time off with pay, but they must allow
employees to use sick leave. Id. 5 1027. The Labor Code does not
"prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging an
employee who, because of the employee's current use of alcohol or
drugs, is unable to perform his or her duties, or cannot perform
1991]
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the duties in a manner which would not endanger his or her health
or safety or the health or safety of others." Id. § 1025.
Drug Testing
California imposes duties on employers who receive medical
information about their employees: every employer must "establish
appropriate procedures to ensure confidentiality and protect [against
the] unauthorized use and disclosure of that information." Cal. Civ.
Code § 56.20(a) (West 1989). These procedures may include instruct-
ing employees and agents who handle files and providing security
systems that restrict access to medical information. Id.
The California Civil Code prohibits a health care provider from
releasing confidential medical information without first obtaining a
patient's authorization. Id. § 56.10. The Code also prohibits discrim-
ination against employees who refuse to authorize the release. See
id. 5 56.20(b).
State regulations permit an employer to condition an offer of
employment on the results of a medical examination conducted to
determine fitness for duty. Cal. Code Regs; tit. 2, § 7294 (1989); see
Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 206-07 (Ct.
App. 1989). Employees entering similar positions, however, must
be subject to the same examination, and if the results of an
examination would result in disqualification, an applicant must have
an opportunity to submit independent medical opinions for consid-
eration before the employer makes a final determination on dis-
qualification. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, 5 7294.0(d); see Wiknson, 264
Cal. Rptr. at 207 n.13.
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution states: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have certain inal-
ienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursu-
ing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." Cal. Const. art.
I, 5 1 (emphasis added).
In three appellate decisions, courts ruled that the California
Constitution imposes privacy constraints on private employers.
Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627-28 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 344 (1990); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal.
Rptr. 280, 283-84 (Ct. App. 1990); Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
In Wilkinson, the California Court of Appeals held that applicant
testing did not violate the right to privacy if the employer provided
a clear notice of testing to prospective employees, no supervised
urination occurred, and procedural safeguards existed to restrict
[Vol. 33:189
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access to test results. Id. at 205. The program's procedures assured
that employers made employment decisions based solely on test
results by masking the names of all individuals tested. Id. In
Semore, the court held that the California Constitution restricted
a private employer's drug testing of current employees by "bal-
ancing an employee's expectations of privacy against the employer's
needs to regulate the conduct of its employees at work." Semore,
266 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
California recognizes numerous exceptions to the employment-
at-will doctrine. One such exception is a discharge that violates a
strong public policy. In Semore, the court held that if an employer
in the private sector terminates an employee for refusing to take
a random drug test, the employee can use the public policy excep-
tion to the employment-at-will doctrine to assert a violation of his
constitutional privacy right. Id. at 282. The court reached a contrary
result in Luck. The court in Luck held that the standard for
identifying a public policy had not been met because the right to
privacy was a private right and, as applied to drug testing of
private sector employees, was not firmly established at the time
of the testing. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
Other potential common law causes of action include: (1) breach
of implied contract to terminate only for good cause or breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see, e.g., id. at 623
(firing a computer programmer when she refused to submit a urine
sample as part of an unannounced drug test); Semore, 266 Cal.
Rptr. at 288-89 (terminating a chemical factory employee for refus-
ing to consent to pupillary reaction eye test used to determine
whether individual is under influence of drugs); (2) invasion of
privacy, see, e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 402, 404 (Ct. App.) (testing student athletes for drugs), review
granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990); and (3) defamation, see, e.g.,
Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir.) (accusing
employee of buying cocaine on the job), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 908
(1987). In Semore, the court held that an employee terminated for
refusing to submit to a pupillary reaction eye test had not stated
causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Semore, 266 Cal.
Rptr. at 289-91.
COLORADO
Handicap Discrimination
Colorado enacted an anti-discrimination act forbidding discrimi-
nation in employment against an otherwise qualified individual
because of that person's handicap, unless: (1) the employer cannot
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reasonably accommodate the handicap; (2) "the handicap actually
disqualifies the person from the job"; and (3) the handicap signifi-
cantly impacts the job. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402(a) (1989).
The Act defines a "handicap" as a physical impairment that
"substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities
and includes a record of such an impairment and being regarded
as having such an impairment." Id. 5 24-34-301(4)(a). Beginning July
1, 1992, the Act will also protect any person who has a mental
impairment, with "mental impairment" defined as "any mental or
psychological disorder such as developmental disability, organic
brain syndrome, mental illness, or specific learning disabilities." Id.
24-34-301(4)(b)(I), (III).
The statute does not explicitly address alcohol or drug abuse or
addiction, and no case law on the application of the statute to those
issues has been found. The Civil Rights Commission has issued
regulations that define "handicap" in similarly broad terms, without
reference to drug or alcohol abuse or addiction. Colo. Code Regs.
60.1 (1980).
CONNECTICUT
Handicap Discrimination
The Connecticut Human Rights Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 5 46a (1986),
prohibits all employers of more than three employees from discrim-
inating on the basis of a past or present physical disability or
mental disorder, "except in the case of a bona fide occupational
qualification or need." Id. § 46a-60.
The statute defines a "physically disabled" person as "any indi-
vidual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impair-
ment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic
processes or changes or from illness." Id. S 46a-51(15). The statute
does not state whether alcoholism or drug addiction qualifies as a
physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, and no cases on this
issue have been found.
Drug Testing
In 1987, Connecticut amended its Employment Regulation Law,
Conn. Gen. Stat. S 31-12 to -57b (1987 & Supp. 1991), to include
regulations for the drug testing of current employees and job
applicants by private sector employers. Id. § 31-51t to -51aa (Supp.
1991). The statute provides:
196 [Vol. 33:189
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[An employer may not determine an employee's eligibility for
promotion, additional compensation, transfer, termination, disci-
plinary or other adverse personnel action solely on the basis of
a positive drug test result unless
(1) the employer has given the employee a urinalysis drug test,
utilizing a reliable methodology, which produced a positive result,
(2) such positive test result was confirmed by a second urinalysis
drug test which was separate and independent from the initial
test, utilizing a reliable methodology, and
(3) such positive test result was confirmed by a third urinalysis
drug test which was separate and independent from the initial
test, utilizing a gas chromatography and mass spectrometry
methodology or a methodology which has been determined to be
as reliable or more reliable than the gas chromatography and
mass spectrometry methodology.
Id. § 31-51u.
To require an employee to submit to a urinalysis test, the
employer must have a "reasonable suspicion" that the employee is
under the influence of drugs or alcohol that may have an actual
or potential adverse effect on job performance. Id. S 31-51x(a). In
the absence of "reasonable suspicion," an employer may require a
test only if: (1) federal law authorizes the test, id. § 31-51x(b)(1); (2)
the employee serves in an occupation that Connecticut law has
designated as a high-risk or safety-sensitive occupation, id. § 31-
51x(b)(2); or (3) the urinalysis is conducted as part of an employee
assistance program sponsored or authorized by the employer and
in which the employee voluntarily participates, id. S 31-51x(b)(3).
An employer may not use urinalysis as part of the application
process unless:
(1) the prospective employee is informed in writing at the time
of application of the employer's intent to conduct such a drug
test[;] (2) such test is conducted in accordance with the require-
ments of [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51u, which requires three positive
test results utilizing reliable methodology;] and (3) the prospective
employee is given a copy of any positive urinalysis drug test
result.
Id. § 31-51v. The employer must keep the results of any applicant's
test confidential and may not disclose them to any person other
than the applicant. Id.
The statute contains detailed procedures for administering tests.
No employer or representative, agent, or designee of the employer
may observe an employee or applicant in the process of producing
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a urine specimen. Id. 5 31-51w. The employer must maintain test
results along with other medical records, and Connecticut's Per-
sonnel Files Law protects the records from unauthorized disclosure.
Id.
The statute specifically reserves the employer's rights to prohibit
the use of drugs or alcohol in the workplace and to discipline an
employee who has violated the prohibition. Id. § 31-51y. An ag-
grieved applicant or employee may seek relief in a private civil
action against the employer. Id. § 31-51z(a). An employer may "be
liable. . . for special and general damages, together with attorneys'
fees and costs." Id. Injunctive relief is also available. Id. § 31-51z(b).
The Attorney General may enforce the statute by way of a civil
action. Id.
In Connecticut, a person hired as a permanent employee or
otherwise for an indefinite period of time is an at-will employee.
See G'raham v. Texasguf, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1451, 1463 (D. Conn.
1987), afj'd without opinion, 842 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1988); Somers v.
Cooley Chevrolet Co., 153 A.2d 426, 428 (Conn. 1959). A limited
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine exists in situations in
which a terminated employee proves a demonstrably improper
reason for dismissal, derived from some clearly expressed, impor-
tant violation of public policy. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388-89 (Conn. 1980); Murray v. Bridgeport Hosp.,
480 A.2d 610, 611 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984). In Johnson v. Carpenter
Technology Corp., 723 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1989), the court held
that a hacksaw operator with twenty-three years of service who
was terminated for refusing to submit to a random drug test could
not state a wrongful discharge claim by alleging the testing con-
travened the common law, Connecticut public policy, or any rights
to privacy emanating from the State or Federal Constitution. Id.
at 184-86.
DELAWARE
Handicap Discrimination
Delaware's Handicapped Persons Employment Protections Act,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, §5 720-728 (Supp. 1990), protects handicapped
persons from discrimination in employment. Id. 5 724(a). A "handi-
capped" person is one who: "a) Has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more major life activities; b) Has
a record of such an impairment; or c) Is regarded as having such
an impairment." Id. S 732(d). The statute further provides that a
"[h]andicapped person shall not include any individual who is an
[Vol. 33:189
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alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs
prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment. .. would constitute a direct threat
to property or the safety of others." Id. § 722(4XcX5).
Unemployment Compensation
In Dock v. M & G Convoy, No. 88A-FE-5, 1988 Del. Super. LEXIS
453 (Dec. 27, 1988), the court held that an employee who refused
a test to determine whether he was under the influence of alcohol
would be ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits if the
employer could prove that the employee was in violation of a
company rule prohibiting employees from being under the influence
during working hours and that the employee did not refuse to take
the test because of confusion over the employer's right to test
under the applicable collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at *3-6.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Handicap Discrimination
The District of Columbia Human Rights Law, Code Ann. § 1-
2501 (1990), prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
a "physical handicap," defined as "a bodily or mental disablement
which may be the result of injury, illness or congenital condition,
for which reasonable accommodation can be made." Id. § 1-2502(23).
The law does not address the issue of its application to individuals
with drug or alcohol abuse problems or disorders. The Employment
Guidelines issued by the D.C. Office of Human Rights and the
Commission on Human Rights elaborate on the definition of hand-
icap, but without reference to drug or alcohol abuse or addiction.
Employment Guidelines § 513. They adopt the provisions promul-
gated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
which are also silent on the issue. See 29 C.F.R. S 1613.701 (1990).
The EEOC regulations, however, are issued pursuant to the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, which provides specifically that employees
whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents them from per-
forming their job or constitutes a threat to the property or the
safety of others are not considered handicapped. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7XB)
(1988).
The Employment Guidelines further state that "all tests offered
applicants and employees shall be related to the job." Employment
Guidelines § 513.6. Absenteeism, even if caused by injury or illness,
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may be grounds for termination if it interferes significantly with
the performance of an employee's duties. Id. § 513.8.
The District of Columbia law separately protects the blind and
"otherwise physically disabled" from discrimination in employment.
D.C. Code Ann. S 6-1705 (1989). In the District of Columbia, physical
disability "means a medically determinable physical impairment
(other than blindness) which interferes with [the] ability to move
about, to assist [oneself], or to engage in an occupation." Id. § 6-
1709(4).
FLORmDA
Handicap Discrimination
The Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 760.
01-.10 (West Supp. 1991), prohibits handicap discrimination in pri-
vate employment. Id. § 760.10. "Handicap" means a "person has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities, or he has a record of having, or is
regarded as having such physical or mental impairment." Id. § 760.
22(7)(a). No case law on the issue of alcoholism or drug addiction
as a handicap has been found.
Drug Testing
Previously, the Workers' Compensation Act provided that no
compensation would be payable if an "injury was occasioned pri-
marily by the intoxication of the employee[, or] by the influence of
any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a
physician, which affected the employee to such an extent that the
employee's normal faculties were impaired." Fla. Stat. Ann. 5 440.
09(3) (West Supp. 1991). If the employee's blood contained .10% or
more alcohol at the time of the injury, the law presumes the injury
was "occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee." Id.
A recent amendment provides that if an "employer has reason
to suspect that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxi-
cation of the employee or by the use of any drug which affected
the employee to the extent that the employee's normal faculties
were impaired, the employer may require the employee to submit"
to a drug or alcohol test. Id. § 440.09(7)(a).
A more comprehensive statute provides: "If an employer imple-
ments a drug-free workplace program which includes notice, edu-
cation, and testing for drugs and alcohol pursuant to rules developed
by the division, the employer may require the employee to submit
200 [Vol. 33:189
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to a test for the presence of drugs or alcohol.. . ." Id. S 440.101
(emphasis added). The employer must give the employee written
notice of the drug policy and testing procedure and must also
afford the employee an opportunity to challenge the results. Id. S
440.102(3). The statute allows and defines the following four types
of testing: "Job applicant" testing, "Reasonable suspicion" testing,
"Routine fitness for duty" testing, and "Follow-up" testing. See id.
§ 440.102(4). The statute sets out specific testing and confirmation
procedures for drug testing that the employer must follow to
protect the employee and provide reasonably accurate results. See
id. § 440.102(5)(9).
The Florida Drug-Free Workplace Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 112.0455
(West Supp. 1991), provides similar standards for drug testing by
agencies within state government.
Unemployment Compensation
A Florida appeals court held that an employee's refusal to submit
to a urinalysis test on demand constituted "misconduct" warranting
the denial of unemployment benefits to the discharged employee.
Fowler v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 537 So. 2d 162, 163 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
GEORGIA
Handicap Discrimination
Georgia has a statute, the Equal Employment for the Handi-
capped Code, Ga. Code Ann. § 34-6A-1 to -6 (1981), prohibiting
discrimination against "handicapped individuals" in private and
public employment. Id. § 34-6A-4. The statute specifically provides
that a "handicapped individual shall not include any person who
is addicted to the use of any drug or illegal or federally controlled
substance nor addiction to the use of alcohol." Id. § 34-6A-2(3).
Drug Testing
Georgia established two classes of state employees for drug-
testing purposes. State employees in "high-risk" jobs, "where
inattention to duty or errors in judgment while on duty will have
the potential for significant risk of harm to the employee, other
employees, or the general public," Ga. Code Ann. § 45-20-90(3)
(1990), are subject to random drug testing, id. S 45-20-91(a). A
positive test result for illegal drugs or refusal to submit to the
1991]
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test constitutes grounds for discharge. Id. § 45-20-93(a), (b). For
non-"high-risk" positions, individuals shall be subject to drug test-
ing when applying for employment with the state. Id. § 45-20-110.
Refusal to submit to the test, or a positive result indicating the
use of illegal drugs, bars the candidate from state employment
for at least two years. Id. § 45-20-111.
The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the discharge of a state
prison employee who tested positive for illegal drugs. Department
of Corrections v. Colbert, 391 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. 1990). The court
rejected the employee's argument that the testing program was
overbroad and found that the state had a compelling interest in
preventing illegal drug use among state employees that out-
weighed the employee's right to privacy. Id. at 761.
HAWAII
Handicap Discrimination
Hawaii law prohibits discrimination in private employment based
on an individual's "handicapped status." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2
(Supp. 1990). "Handicapped status" means "the state of having a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities, having a record of such an impairment,
or being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 378-1. No
statutory exclusion exists for impairments caused by drug or
alcohol use.
Hawaii requires that all insurance policies, medical service plan
contracts, and health plan contracts issued in the state include
coverage for alcohol and drug abuse treatment services. Id.
S 431M-2.
Drug Testing
Hawaii makes it unlawful for an employer to "[u]tilize any
device that intrudes into any part or cavity of the body for the
purpose of truth verification." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-26.5(5) (Supp.
1990). Although this statute is directed specifically to lie detector
tests, it arguably applies to a drug or alcohol test an employer
administers after asking an employee about drug or alcohol use.
IDAHO
Handicap Discrimination
The Idaho Fair Employment Practices Act prohibits discrim-
ination by an employer on the basis of an individual's handicap.
[Vol. 33:189
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Idaho Code § 67-5909 (1990). The statute defines a "handicap"
as a "physical or mental condition of a person, whether congen-
ital or acquired, which constitutes a substantial disability to
that person and is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical
or laboratory diagnostic techniques" and further provides that
"[a] handicapped person is one who (a) has such a disability, or
(b) has a record of such a disability, or (c) is regarded as having
such a disability." Id. § 67-5902(15). This statute does not ex-
pressly exclude alcohol or drug abusers from the protected class
of handicapped persons.
In Holmes v. Union Oil Co., 760 P.2d 1189 (Idaho 1988), the
court held that an employee's at-will status was transformed by
a letter from his employer conditioning continued employment
on his participation in a rehabilitation program following a
conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. The court
held that at least for the period of rehabilitation, the employer
could not fire the employee except for cause. Id. at 1193.
ILLINOIS
Handicap Discrimination
The Illinois Constitution prohibits discrimination by any em-
ployer in hiring and promotion against persons with a physical
or mental handicap unrelated to ability to perform the job. Ill.
Const. art. I, § 19. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that this constitutional provi-
sion provided a cause of action to a public employee discharged
due to alcoholism. Athanas v. Board of Educ., 28 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 569, 573-74 (N.D. Ill. 1980). No cases that
construe the provision in the context of private employment
have been found.
The Illinois Human Rights Act protects against discrimination
in employment based on an individual's physical or mental
handicap. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, para. 1-101 (1988). Although the
statute does not expressly mention drug and alcohol addiction,
the Illinois Human Rights Commission has promulgated inter-
pretive guidelines stating that drug and alcohol abuse shall not
be considered "handicaps" unless the employee can demonstrate
that the condition arises from or constitutes the equivalent of
a disease or functional disorder. Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56, S 2500
(1990). The guidelines further state that a drug or alcohol abuser
is protected from discrimination only if the abuse is unrelated
to the employee's ability to perform job duties. Id. S 2500.20(d)(2).
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Substance abuse that manifests itself in excessive absence or
tardiness, or intoxication at work, is presumptively related to
an employee's ability to perform. Id.
In Habinka v. Human Rights Commission, 548 N.E.2d 702 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989), the court specifically distinguished drug and
alcohol "abuse" from a dependency that "arises from or consti-
tutes the equivalent of a disease or functional disorder." Id. at
719. Because the plaintiff, who claimed that his chronic opiate
dependency was a handicap within the meaning of the Human
Rights Act, did not offer sufficient medical evidence that the
"dependency" constituted a disease, functional disorder, or its
equivalent, the court held that the Act did not protect him. Id.
at 729.
Drug Testing
Illinois law grants the Illinois Department of Public Health
the authority to assist in the development of drug education
and treatment programs for businesses and industries. Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 111-112, para. 6356-3 (1990). To date, the Department
has issued no regulations that affect private employers in this
area.
INDIANA
Handicap Discrimination
The Indiana Civil Rights Law, Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-1 to
-13 (Burns 1986), prohibits handicap discrimination in employ-
ment against properly qualified persons. Id. § 22-9-1-2(b). A
"handicap" is a "physical or mental condition of a person which
constitutes a substantial disability unrelated to the person's
ability to engage in a particular occupation." Id. § 22-9-1-3(q).
The statute specifically provides that handicap discrimination
does not include an employer's "failure . . . to employ or to
retain as an employee any person who because of a handicap is
physically or otherwise unable to efficiently and safely perform,
at the standards set by the employer, the duties required in
that job." Id. S 22-9-1-13. No regulations or cases have been
found applying these provisions to an employee or applicant
with drug or alcohol abuse or addiction problems.
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IOWA
Handicap Discrimination
The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Iowa Code S 601A.1-.19
(Supp. 1989), prohibits discrimination in employment based on
an individual's disability, "unless based upon the nature of the
occupation." Id. § 601A.6(1)(a). The Act defines "disability"
broadly as "the physical or mental condition of a person which
constitutes a substantial handicap." Id. S 601A.2(4). The rules of
the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, which has jurisdiction over
complaints made pursuant to the Act, appear in Iowa Admin.
Code r. 161-1.1 (1988). Those rules define a "substantially hand-
icapped person" as any person who has a "physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life
activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded
as having such an impairment." Id. r. 161-8.26(1).
In Consolidated Freightways v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Com-
mission, 366 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1985), the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that alcoholism may be a handicap under a Cedar Rapids
ordinance prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped in
employment. Id. at 527-28. The court found the ordinance consis-
tent with the provisions of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, insofar as
alcoholism is a protected disability if it does not prevent proper
job performance. Id. at 527. The court upheld the trial court's
finding that the employee, a sales representative, "had a sub-
stantial handicap but that, because he had achieved sobriety with
reasonable prospects of maintaining that status, his handicap did
not prevent him from properly performing his job." Id. at 534-
35.
Drug Testing
Iowa has a criminal statute, enforceable alternatively in a
private civil action, regulating drug testing of employees or
applicants. Iowa Code § 730.5 (Supp. 1989). The statute prohibits
testing of current employees unless the employer has either a
known rule against impairment on the job or probable cause to
suspect drug use of an employee who holds a safety-sensitive
position. Id. The employer must provide substance abuse evalu-
ation and treatment for any employee who tests positive and
may not discharge an employee who participates in treatment
after the first positive test. Id.
1991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
An employer may require drug tests of current employees in
connection with regularly scheduled physicals if the employer
gives notice at least thirty days prior to the physicals. Id. § 730.
5(7)(b). An employer may test applicants in connection with phys-
ical examinations only if the employer makes the testing require-
ment part of all advertisements and applications and personally
notifies the prospective employees. Id. § 730.5(7)(a). The Act sets
forth confidentiality and accuracy requirements for all testing.
Id. 5 730.5(8).
By its terms, the statute does not apply to preemployment
drug tests for peace or correctional officers of the state, nor to
drug tests required under federal statutes, either conducted
pursuant to nuclear regulatory commission policy or used to
determine an employee's eligibility for workers' compensation
benefits. Id.
KANSAS
Handicap Discrimination
The Kansas Acts Against Discrimination, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-
1001 to -1044 (1986), prohibit discrimination in employment against
an individual because of a "physical handicap." Id. § 44-1009(a)(1).
The Acts define "physical handicap" as "the physical condition
of a person, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury
or disease which constitutes a substantial disability, but is un-
related to such person's ability to engage in a particular job or
occupation." Id. § 44-1002(j). No regulations or cases have been
found addressing the application of the definition of physical
handicap to drug or alcohol abuse or addiction.
Drug Testing
Kansas has adopted regulations establishing a drug-screening
program for applicants and current employees in safety-sensitive
positions in state government. Kan. Admin. Regs. § 1-6-32, 1-9-
19(a) (Supp. 1990). Applicant testing is appropriate if the employer
has "given a conditional offer of employment for a safety-sensitive
position," id. § 1-6-32(a), and has also advised the applicant of the
testing procedure, the confidentiality provisions, and the appeal
process, id. § 1-6-32(e). An employer may require testing of an
employee in a "safety-sensitive position" if the employer has
"reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use," id. § 1-9-19a(a), and
has similarly advised the employee, id. § 1-9-19a(b). An employer
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may dismiss an employee who tests positive unless the employee
has no prior positive results and completes an appropriate treat-
ment program. Id. S 1-9-19a(f).
Unemployment Compensation
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that in the absence of
evidence that an employee's drug use has actual on-the-job im-
pact, dismissal for failing a urine test does not disqualify the
employee from eligibility for unemployment compensation bene-
fits. National Gypsum Co. v. State Employment Sec. Bd. of Review,
772 P.2d 786, 792-93 (Kan. 1989). The Kansas Court of Appeals,
however, denied unemployment benefits to an employee who
continued to use illegal drugs while undergoing an employer-
sponsored rehabilitation program. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
State Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, No. 65225, 1991 Kan. App.
LEXIS 97 (Feb. 15, 1991).
KENTUCKY
Handicap Discrimination
The Kentucky Equal Opportunities Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 207.130-.260 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment due to a person's handicap, "unless, the
handicap restricts [the] individual's ability to engage in the par-
ticular job or occupation for which he or she is eligible" and
discrimination due to a physical handicap, unless the handicap
"constitutes a bona fide and necessary reason" for such treat-
ment. Id. § 207.150. The Act specifically states that "nothing
contained [herein] shall be construed to prohibit the rejection of
an applicant for employment. . . on the basis of. . . any handicap
which is not demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or lab-
oratory diagnostic techniques, including, but not limited to, al-
coholism, drug addiction, and obesity." Id. S 207.140. Because the
exception specifically applies only to applicants for employment,
its effect on current employees with an alcohol or drug addiction
is unclear.
LOUISIANA
Handicap Discrimination
Louisiana has a statute prohibiting employment discrimination
against qualified handicapped persons. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
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45:2254(A) (West 1982). A person is "qualified" if he or she can
perform the essential functions of a job with reasonable accom-
modation. Id. § 46:2253(4)(a). A "handicapped" person is one "who
has an impairment which substantially limits one or more life
activities or (a) has a record of such impairment or (b) is regarded
as having such an impairment." Id. § 46:2253(1). "Impairment"
includes physical or physiological disorders or conditions and
mental disorders or conditions. Id. Employers have discretion not
to consider chronic alcoholism or active drug addiction to be an
impairment. Id. S 46:2553(2). In Casse v. Louisiana General Ser-
vices, Inc., 531 So. 2d 554 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 533 So. 2d
375 (La. 1988), the court held that individuals who were drug
users, but not perceived as addicts, were not handicapped within
the meaning of the statute. Id. at 555.
The statute also prohibits employers from making decisions
concerning hiring, promotion, or discharge of a qualified handi-
capped person on the basis of either physical or mental exami-
nations or preemployment interviews that are not job related or
not required of all employees. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2254(C)(4-
(5). The "use of a written or oral inquiry or form of application
that elicits or attempts to elicit information concerning the hand-
icap of a prospective employee for discriminatory purposes" or
"that expresses a preference, limitation, or specification" for
nonhandicapped individuals is also unlawful. Id. § 46:2254(C)(8),
(10). Finally, an employer may not make records, keep records,
or disclose information concerning the handicap of a prospective
employee for discriminatory purposes. Id. 5 46:2254(C)(9).
Drug Testing
Louisiana's unemployment compensation law provides that an
individual is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits
if his employer discharged him for using illegal drugs either on
or off the job. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 23:1601(10)(a) (West Supp.
1991). To support a disqualification, the employer must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the employee used a non-
prescribed controlled substance. Id. Proof arising from a drug
test done by an employer is limited to the results of a test
administered pursuant to a written and promulgated substance
abuse policy. Id. "Discharge of an employee for refusal to submit
to a drug test . . . shall be presumed to be for misconduct." Id.
Drug testing in the unemployment compensation context must
be conducted "under reasonably sanitary conditions. . . with due
regard to the privacy of the individual being tested, and in a
[Vol. 33:189
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
manner reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions or inter-
ference with the collection or testing of reliable samples." Id.
S 23:1601(10)(c). An employee must have an opportunity "to pro-
vide notification of any information . .. relevant to the test,
including identification of currently or recently used prescription
or nonprescription drugs." Id. The law also requires that all
"[t]ests include verification or confirmation . ..by gas chroma-
tography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or another
comparably reliable analytical method, before the result of any
test may be used" to establish ineligibility for unemployment
benefits. Id. § 23:1601(10)(c)(v). Employers may use only test re-
sults that exclude the possibility of passive inhalation of mari-
juana as a basis for disqualification. Id.
An employer's written and promulgated substance abuse policy
may require the collection and testing of samples for: individual
employee impairment investigations; accident or workplace theft
investigations; safety or security measures; and productivity or
quality maintenance. Id. § 23:1601(10)(d).
The statute further provides:
(e) All information, interviews, reports, statements, memo-
randa, or test results received by the employer through its
drug testing program are confidential communications and may
not be used or received in evidence, obtained in discovery, or
disclosed in any public or private proceeding, except in a
proceeding related to an action . . . for unemployment com-
pensation proceeding, hearing, or civil litigation where drug
use by the tested employee is relevant.
(f) No cause of action for defamation[,]... libel, slander, or
damage to reputation [may be brought] . . .against an em-
ployer who has established a program of drug or alcohol testing
in accordance with this Chapter unless:
(i) The results of that test were disclosed to any person
other than the employer, an authorized employee or agent of
the employer, the tested employee, or the tested prospective
employee;
(ii) The information disclosed was based on a false test result;
and
(iii) All elements of an action for defamation, libel, slander
or damage to reputation as established by statute or common
law, are satisfied.
Id. § 23:1601(10)(e), (f).
A provision in the Louisiana Constitution that protects persons
from "invasions of privacy," La. Const. art. I, § 5, may apply to
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private conduct. Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 849
F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1988) (watching plaintiff urinate to collect
sample for drug-testing program violates constitutional right to
privacy). In Kelley, an employee brought claims for tortious in-
vasion of privacy and negligent infliction of emotional distress
against his former employer. The claims resulted from the ob-
servation by the employer's representative of the employee's
urination for the drug test and the discharge of the employee
after the test revealed drug use. Id. at 42. In the district court,
the jury found for the plaintiff on both claims. Id. at 46. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, applying
Louisiana law, affirmed the decision. Id. The court upheld the
jury instruction that an employer "has a duty to use reasonable
care in implementing and administering its drug program so as
not to cause serious emotional distress to its employees." Id. at
43.
In Casse v. Louisiana General Services, Inc., 531 So. 2d 554
(La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 533 So. 2d 375 (La. 1988), the court
held that two employees who were discharged after voluntarily
submitting to drug testing had no cause of action because Louis-
iana has an employment-at-will statute, La. Civ. Code Ann. art.
2747 (West 1952). Casse, 533 So. 2d at 555. The court also held
that the employees waived the constitutional right to privacy by
consenting to urinalysis testing. Id. The employer did not abuse
any rights of the plaintiffs by imposing mandatory drug testing
because, as a distributor of a highly, volatile substance, the
company had a "serious interest in maintaining a drug-free work-
ing environment." Id.; see also Varnado v. Roadway Express, 557
So. 2d 413, 415 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (terminating at-will employee
because of allegedly inaccurate urinalysis revealing marijuana
use was not state tort action for wrongful termination).
MAINE
Handicap Discrimination
The Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §
4551-4655 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990), prohibits employment dis-
crimination against the mentally or physically handicapped, ex-
cept when based on a bona fide occupational qualification. Id.
4572.
Nothing in the Act, however, prohibits an employer from
discharging or refusing to hire a physically or mentally handi-
capped employee (1) when the employee's handicap renders him
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"unable to perform his duties" or (2) when the handicap is
dangerous to the health or safety of himself or others. Id. S 4573.
"Physical or mental handicap" includes disabilities caused by
"environmental conditions or illness," conditions that certain med-
ical professionals diagnose as handicaps, and "any other health
or sensory impairment which requires special education, voca-
tional rehabilitation or related services." Id. 5 4553(7-A).
Drug Testing
Sections 681-690 of Title 26 of the Maine Revised Statutes
regulate comprehensively all drug- and alcohol-testing procedures
in the workplace. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §5 681-690 (West
Supp. 1990). The statute specifically exempts from its coverage
other workplace rules relating to substance abuse. It "does not
prevent an employer from establishing rules related to the pos-
session or use of substances of abuse by employees, including
convictions for drug-related offenses, and taking action based
upon a violation of any of those rules" except when the employer
implements drug testing as the basis for disciplinary action. Id.
§ 681(7). The statute also does not prohibit "employer[s] from
requiring or performing medical examinations of employees or
applicants or from conducting medical screenings to monitor
exposure to toxic. . . substances[, as long as those] examinations
are not used to avoid the [statute]." Id. 5 681(6). Finally, the
statute does not apply to nuclear electrical generating facilities
and their employees, to independent contractors working at those
facilities, or to certain interstate motor carriers. Id. § 681(8).
"Before establishing any substance abuse testing program. ...
an employer with over 20 full-time employees must have a func-
tioning employee assistance program." Id. S 683(1). The Depart-
ment of Human Services must certify the program pursuant to
rules promulgated under section 687. Id. Before testing com-
mences, an employer must develop a written policy that includes:
(1) the positions subject to testing; (2) the procedures for sample
collection; (3) the procedures for storage of samples; (4) the cut-
off levels for screening and confirmation tests; (5) the conse-
quences of a positive test result or of a refusal to submit to a
test; and (6) appeal procedures. Id. S 683(2). An employer must
seek employee input during the development of the written
policy. Id.
Employers are prohibited from requiring or requesting the use
of consent forms, id. 5 683(4); are required to use qualified testing
laboratories, id. 5 683(6); and are required to adhere to the rules
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regarding the reporting of laboratory results and the limitations
placed on use of the tests, id. S 683(8)-(10). An employer cannot
require an employee or applicant to remove any clothing during
the collection of a urine sample, but, if the standard practice of
an off-site medical facility requires removal of clothing for collec-
tion of a urine sample, that practice can be followed. Id. 5 683(2)(C).
An employer must submit the proposed testing criteria and
procedures to the Department of Labor for approval. Id. 5 686.
All actions taken subsequent to approval must be consistent with
administrative rules promulgated by the Departments of Labor
and Human Resources. Id. Employers must furnish employees
with copies of the approved written testing policy and the statute
at least thirty days before implementing and at least sixty days
before changing the policy. Id. § 683(3). An employer may "re-
quire, request or suggest" that a job applicant submit to testing
after making an offer of employment or offering a position on an
eligibility list. Id. 5 684(1). The employer may condition the offer
on a negative test result. Id.
Finally, an employer may require tests of current employees
if "probable cause" exists. Id. § 684(2). Probable cause is "a
reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts that induce
a person to believe that an employee may be under the influence
of a substance of abuse." Id. 5 682(6). A substance of abuse is
"any scheduled drug, alcohol or other drug, or any of their
metabolites." Id. 5 682(8). An employer may not base a decision
that probable cause exists exclusively on: (1) a tip from an
anonymous informant; (2) information about off-duty use; or (3) a
"single work-related accident." Id. 5 682(6). Only certain supervi-
sory and security personnel may make a probable cause deter-
mination. Id. § 684(2). The employer must state the facts leading
to his determination of probable cause ih writing and provide a
copy of this statement to the employee. Id. The statute also
provides:
[A]n employer may require, request or suggest that an em-
ployee submit to a substance abuse test on a random or
arbitrary basis [only where: 1)] the employer and the employee
have bargained for provisions in a collective bargaining agree-
ment ... that provide for random or arbitrary testing[, or 2)]
the employee works in a position [that poses] an unreasonable
threat to the health or safety of the public or the employee's
co-workers if the employee [is] under the influence of a sub-
stance of abuse.
Id. 5 684(3).
Facilities providing treatment to an employee need not comply
with the statute. Id. § 684(4). An employer, however, may not
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"require, request or suggest" that a treating facility perform
substance abuse testing, and an employer may not receive the
results of any tests performed in connection with the employee's
rehabilitation. Id.
The statute places restrictions on the actions an employer can
take based on results of substance abuse testing. The statute
empowers an employer to suspend an employee with full pay and
benefits or to transfer him to another position before results of
confirmation testing are received. Id. § 685(1). Once positive
results are confirmed, or if an employee or applicant refuses to
submit to a test, an employer may revoke an offer of employment,
discharge an employee, discipline an employee, or change an
employee's status. Id. § 685(2). An employer must first offer an
employee who initially tests positive at least six months of
rehabilitation. Id. If the employee refuses treatment, the em-
ployer can discharge, discipline, or transfer him. Id. If an em-
ployee participates in rehabilitation, the employer may not
discharge or discipline him but may transfer or suspend him
from active duty to reduce any possible safety hazard. Id.
§ 685(2)(C)(2). The employer may not reduce pay or benefits while
an employee is participating in a rehabilitation program, but the
employer need not pay the employee for time-off for rehabilitation
purposes. Id. "All information acquired by the employer in the
testing process is confidential and may not be released," except
to certain individuals involved in the testing and rehabilitation
processes. Id. § 685(3).
An employer who discharges an employee in violation of the
statute is liable in a civil action for: (1) three times lost wages;
(2) reinstatement with full benefits; and (3) attorneys' fees. Id.
§ 689(1). An employee may also recover separate civil penalties
for an employer's breach of confidentiality in the amount of $1000
for a first offense and $2000 for any subsequent offense. Id.
5689(2).
In Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 561 A.2d 499 (Me.
1989), an employee sued an employer who discharged him for
operating a company car while under the influence of alcohol.
The court held that the employee had no constitutional due
process claim in the absence of state action, even in such a
heavily regulated industry. Id. at 501. Because the plaintiff pre-
sented no evidence that an express restriction applied to the
employer's common law right to discharge him at will, the court
determined the discharge was not wrongful. Id. a't 501. Finally,
the court held that the employer's conduct was not so extreme
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and outrageous as to support a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id.
MARYLAND
Handicap Discrimination
Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act, Md. Ann. Code
art. 49B, 5 1-28 (1991), prohibits discrimination in private em-
ployment against any individual because of a physical or mental
handicap. Id. S 16. "Physical handicap" includes any "physical
disability [or] infirmity . . . which is caused by. . . illness," and
mental handicap includes any "mental impairment or deficiency."
Id. § 15(g). No cases regarding the application of the statutory
definitions to alcohol and drug abuse or addiction have been
found.
Drug Testing
Maryland's drug-testing statute, Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann.
17-214.1 (1990), specifically grants private employers the right
to conduct testing for drug or alcohol use among current em-
ployees or applicants. The Act prescribes standards and proce-
dures that employers must follow when testing and reporting
test results to affected individuals. Id.
An employee whose sample tests positive is entitled to inde-
pendent testing for verification. Id. 5 17-214.1(d). All testing must
take place at a laboratory with a permit issued under the statute
or approved by the Maryland Department of Mental Health and
Hygiene. Id. § 17-214.1(b). At the time of testing, an employer
must provide the employee with the name and address of the
testing laboratory. Id. The laboratory may not report positive
test results directly to an employer if the substance in question
either is a legal nonprescription drug or a prescription drug that
the employee is able to show was prescribed to him. Id. § 17-
214.1(h).
MASSACHUSETTS
Handicap Discrimination
The Massachusetts statute on fair employment practices for-
bids discrimination in employment against qualified handicapped
persons on the basis of their handicap. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
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ch. 151B, § 1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). A "handicapped" person
is a person who has "(a) a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . ; [or (b)
has] a record of having such impairment; or (c) [is] regarded as
having such impairment." Id. § 1(17).
The definition further requires that a person must be "capable
of performing the essential functions of a particular job, or...
would be capable of performing the essential functions . . . with
reasonable accommodation to his handicap." Id. 5 1(16). Factors
that courts consider in determining whether an accommodation
is reasonable or whether it would impose an undue hardship on
the employer include: "(1) the overall size of the employer's
business . . . and size of budget . . ; (2) the type of the
employer's operation, including the composition and structure of
the employer's workforce; and (3) the nature and cost of the
accommodation needed." Id. 5 4(16). The statute does not specif-
ically address whether alcoholics or substance abusers are "hand-
icapped." However, guidelines published by the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, effective September 30, 1986,
provide that substance abusers can qualify as "handicapped"
under the Fair Employment Practices Law. Massachusetts Com-
mission Against Discrimination, Guidelines: Employment Discrim-
ination on the Basis of Handicap, 8 Mass. Discrimination L. Rep.
2003, 2006 (Sept. 30, 1986).
Under the guidelines, recreational users, or those not physically
or mentally dependent, are not considered handicapped. Id. The
substance or alcohol abuse must result from a physical or mental
addiction and one or more of the abuser's major life activities
must be affected for the abuser to benefit from the Act's pro-
tection. Id.
An employer may condition an offer of employment "on the
results of a medical examination conducted solely for the purpose
of determining whether the employee, with reasonable accom-
modation, is capable of performing the essential functions of the
job." Id. at 2014. A medical exam may be conducted only after
the employer has offered the job to the applicant with the
condition that the applicant pass the exam. The medical exam
itself must also meet certain criteria. For example, the only
information obtained from the medical exam that should be given
to the employer is the "opinion of the examining physician or
health care practitioner that the prospective employee is either
able or unable to perform the essential functions of the job." Id.
at 2015 (emphasis added).
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In Sexton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 809 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1987), an
alcoholic employee sued his employer under the statutory pred-
ecessor to the Fair Employment Practices Law, arguing that his
employer discharged him because of his handicap. The court held
that the employer was entitled to a favorable judgment because
the plaintiff had not shown that the employer failed to accom-
modate reasonably the plaintiff's handicap. Id. at 169. The only
evidence consisted of the employee's suggestions of what the
employer could have done. Id. The employee did not prove that
he pursued the suggestions with his employer or that the sugges-
tions, if implemented, would have accommodated his alcoholism.
Id. The court also held that the plaintiff had failed to establish
that the discharge was due solely to his alcoholism, as required
by the predecessor statute. Id. at 168-69.
Drug Testing
A statutory right of privacy in Massachusetts may enable
employees to avoid substance abuse testing. Under the statute,
"[a] person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial
or serious interference with his privacy." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 214, § 1B (West 1989). The Massachusetts Superior Court has
jurisdiction to enforce the right and to award damages for inter-
ference with the right. Id.
In Bally v. Northeastern University, 532 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989),
a student-athlete challenged the private university's drug-testing
program under the right-to-privacy statute. The court held against
him, reasoning that the student did not prove public disclosure
of confidential information, an element essential to statutory
right-to-privacy actions. Id. at 53-54. The court further explained
that a claim under the Massachusetts Constitution would also
have been unsuccessful because no direct action may be brought
under the Massachusetts Constitution against a private employer;
state action is required. Id. at 51 n.3 (dictum).
The plaintiff in Batly also challenged the university's drug-
testing program under the Civil Rights Act. The court held
against him on the ground that he presented no proof of threats,
intimidation, or coercion, elements essential to all actions under
the Act. Id. at 51-52. To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show
action directed toward a particular individual or class of persons.
Id. at 52. The court characterized the testing program as indis-
criminate and impartial. Id. at 53.
In Bratt v. International Business Machines Corp., 467 N.E.2d
126 (Mass. 1984), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that an
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employer's disclosure of private facts about an employee to other
company employees may violate the statute. Id. at 134. The court
also explained that disclosure by employers of defamatory med-
ical information concerning employees that is relevant to the
employees' fitness to perform work is subject to a conditional
privilege that can be lost only if the employee proves that the
disclosure: (1) resulted from an "expressly malicious motive";
(2) was "recklessly disseminated"; or (3) was made with "reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of the information." Id. at 133.
In a subsequent proceeding, Bratt v. International Business Ma-
chines Corp., 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986), the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that an employer's distri-
bution of memoranda stating that an employee had been diag-
nosed as paranoid and had a mental problem did not violate the
statute because: (1) the information was not widely distributed;
(2) the individuals receiving the information needed to know in
order to properly supervise and manage the employee; (3) the
employer did not violate any internal regulations; and (4) the
information was relevant to the evaluation of the employee's
conduct. Id. at 360.
In Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989), the First Circuit also
held that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), preempted an action brought by a
union employee discharged after testing positive for marijuana.
Id. at 114-15. The right-to-privacy statute upon which the plaintiff
relied did not unequivocally deny employers the right to test
employees. Id. at 114. Analysis of the right-to-privacy claim
would, therefore, require interpretation of the parties' collective-
bargaining agreement. Id.
Under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 12, §§ 11H, I (West 1986), plaintiffs claimed a right to
be free from involuntary drug-testing programs. Sections H and
I of the Civil Rights Act provide in pertinent part:
H. Whenever any person or persons, whether or not acting
under color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coer-
cion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coer-
cion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or
persons of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the
United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws
of the commonwealth, the attorney general may bring a civil
action for injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief. ...
I. Any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured
by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights
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secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has
been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as
described in section 11H, may institute and prosecute in his
own name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive
and other appropriate equitable relief as provided for in said
section, including the award of compensatory money damages.
Id.
The Massachusetts Constitution provides that all citizens of
Massachusetts have the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XIV. In Jackson,
after balancing the private employer's interests and the employ-
ee's privacy rights the First Circuit held that the Massachusetts
Constitution did not create a right for employees to be free from
all drug testing by their employers. Jackson, 863 F.2d at 115-17.
MICHIGAN
Handicap Discrimination
The Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 37.1101-.1606 (1991), prohibits discrimination in hiring,
recruiting, promoting, or discharging with respect to the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of a handicap
that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties
of a particular job or position." Id. S 37.1202(1)(a), (b). The statute
defines "handicap" as a determinable physical or mental charac-
teristic of an individual or a history of the characteristic "which
may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or
functional disorder." Id. 5 37.1103(e). In DiTomaso v. Electronic
Data Systems, No. 87-CV-60320AA, 1988 WL 156317 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 7, 1988), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan found that the plaintiff employees did not
prove their employer violated the Handicap Act by terminating
them on the basis of marijuana use. Id. at *6. The employees
denied any impairment or handicap resulting from drug use in
their depositions and had based their claims on the premise that
drug use did not affect their job performance. Id. The court did
not address whether drug or alcohol addiction might be a "hand-
icap" under different circumstances.
Drug Testing
Michigan's Constitution protects its citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures, Mich. Const. art. I, 5 11, but its provisions
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do not govern private employers. In DiTomaso, the plaintiffs,
security guards who were discharged by their employer following
positive urinalyses for marijuana, brought suit against their em-
ployer alleging: (1) breach of a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligence;
(4) invasion of privacy; (5) defamation; and (6) wrongful discharge.
Id. at *3. The court granted summary judgment to the employer
on all claims. Id. The court declared that Michigan does not imply
a covenant to act in good faith in an at-will employment relation-
ship. Id. The court found that drug testing followed by employment
termination does not inflict distress so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it. Id. at *4. The court deemed
the claim of negligence inappropriate because no independent action
in tort existed for the conduct in question. Id. The court also held
that the employer had a significant interest in assuring the guards
were free from off-duty illegal drug use, and therefore testing for
such use does not constitute an invasion of privacy unless the
method employed to secure the test is objectionable to a reasonable
person. Id. at *5. Because the plaintiffs offered no evidence to
support the claim that the employer publicly disclosed the test
results, the defamation claim was deficient. Id. at *4. Finally, the
court held that an employee cannot rely on the Michigan Consti-
tution in asserting a wrongful discharge claim based on a violation
of public policy. Id.
MINNESOTA
Handicap Discrimination
The Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. S 363.01-.15
(West 1991), prohibits discrimination in employment based on an
individual's disability. Id. § 363.03. The definition of "disability" is
a physical or mental "impairment which materially limits one or
more major life activities," a "record of such an impairment," or a
perception of such an impairment. Id. § 363.01(13). The statute
excludes "any condition resulting from alcohol or drug abuse which
prevents a person from performing the essential functions of the
job in question or constitutes a direct threat to property or the
safety of others:' Id. S 363.01(35)(2). In Gruening v. Pinotti, 392
N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the court held that alcoholism
can meet the statutory definition of disability. Id. at 674.
The rule of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights relating
to certificates of compliance of public contracts, Minn. R. 5000.3400
(1990), similarly limits the definition of a disabled individual, ex-
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cluding an individual whose current use of alcohol or drugs renders
that individual a hazard to himself or others. Minn. R. 5000.3400(13)
(1989).
Drug Testing
Minnesota's law regulating drug and alcohol testing in the work-
place, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.950-.957 (West Supp. 1991), prohibits
employers from "request[ing] or requir[ing] an employee or job
applicant to undergo drug and alcohol testing on an arbitrary or
capricious basis." Id. § 181.951(1)(c).
Certain types of testing, however, are acceptable. An employer
may require a job applicant to undergo a test if he has extended
a conditional job offer and requires the same test of all applicants.
Id. § 181.951(2). "An employer may request or require [a current]
employee to undergo drug or alcohol testing, as part of a routine
annual physical examination" with two weeks written notice. Id.
§ 181.951(3). "An employer may request or require . . . employees
in safety-sensitive positions to undergo drug or alcohol testing on
a random selection basis." Id. § 181.951(4) (emphasis added). A
"safety-sensitive position" is "a job, including any supervisory or
management position, in which an impairment caused by drug or
alcohol usage would threaten the health or safety of any person."
Id. S 181.950(13). The statute permits suspicion testing if the
employer reasonably suspects that the employee: (1) is under the
influence of drugs or alcohol; (2) has violated written work rules
prohibiting use of drugs or alcohol while operating an employer's
vehicle; (3) has sustained a personal injury or has caused personal
injury to another employee; or (4) "has caused a work-related
accident or was operating or helping to operate machinery, equip-
ment, or vehicles involved in a work-related accident." Id. §
181.951(5).
The employer must conduct all testing pursuant to and consistent
with the terms of a written policy conforming to statutory stan-
dards. Id. § 181.951(1). These standards require an employer's drug-
and alcohol-testing policy to identify the following: (1) the employees
subject to testing; (2) the circumstances under which the employer
will require testing; (3) "the right of an employee or job applicant
to refuse . . . testing and the consequences of refusal"; (4) "any
disciplinary or adverse personnel action" that the employer may
take based on test results; and (5) "the right of an employee or
job applicant to explain a positive result . . . or request and pay
for confirmatory testing." Id. § 181.952(1). Before testing, the em-
ployer must provide the employee or job applicant with a form on
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which the employee or job applicant acknowledges that he has
seen the employer's written policy, identifies intake of any over-
the-counter or prescription medications, and provides any other
information relevant to the reliability of, or explanation for, a
positive test result. Id. § 181.953(6). "Within three working days
after notice of a positive test result on a confirmatory test, the
employee or job applicant may submit [other] information to the
employer. . . to explain [the] result, or may request a confirmatory
retest of the original sample at the employee's or job applicant's
[expense]." Id.
All testing must take place in a laboratory licensed by the
Commissioner of Health. Id. S 181.953(1). However, a breath test
used as an initial screening test for alcohol may be performed
by a medical clinic, hospital, or other medical facility not owned
or operated by the employer. Id. The Act provides for the
adoption of rules governing: (1) standards for licensure; (2) col-
lection procedures which ensure privacy and prevent tampering;
(3) threshold detection levels; and (4) chain-of-custody procedures
and retention/storage procedures for mandatory confirmatory
tests and retests of original samples. Id.
The Act specifically provides that an employer may not dis-
charge an employee after a first positive result, even after
confirmatory testing, unless the following conditions have been
met:
(1) the employer has first given the employee an opportunity
to participate in, at the employee's own expense or pursuant
to coverage under an employee benefit plan, either a drug or
alcohol counseling or rehabilitation program, whichever is
more appropriate, as determined by the employer after con-
sultation with a certified chemical use counselor or a physician
trained in the diagnosis and treatment of chemical depend-
ency; and
(2) the employee has either refused to participate in a coun-
seling or rehabilitation program or has failed to successfully
complete the program, as evidenced by withdrawal from the
program before its completion or by a positive test result on
a confirmatory test after completion of the program.
Id. § 181.953(10)(b)(1), (2).
In City of Minneapolis v. Johnson, 450 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990), the court held that, although the statute prohibits
employers from discharging employees based on a single positive
test result if the employee agrees to participate in a rehabili-
tation program, an employer did not violate the statute by
discharging a police officer who tested positive for the first
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time. Id. at 160. The employer sustained the burden of proving
the police department based the discharge not on the test result,
but on the fact that the officer admitted using cocaine and failed
to intervene in, or report, the use of cocaine he witnessed at a
party. Id. at 161. The Act provides:
[Aln employer may temporarily suspend the tested employee
or transfer that employee to another position at the same
rate of pay pending the outcome of the confirmatory test and,
if requested, the confirmatory retest, provided the employer
believes that it is reasonably necessary to protect the health
or safety of the employee, co-employees, or the public. An
employee who has been suspended without pay must be
reinstated with back pay if the outcome of the confirmatory
test or requested confirmatory retest is negative.
Id. 5 181.953(10)(c).
In addition, employers must allow employees to have access
to: (1) information contained in the employee's personnel file
regarding positive test results; (2) any information acquired in
the drug- and alcohol-testing process; and (3) any conclusions
the employer reached based on the reports and other informa-
tion. Id. S 181.953(10)(e).
Test results constitute private and confidential information
and an employer may not disclose them without the written
consent of the employee or job applicant. Id. § 181.954(2). An
employer, however, may use evidence of a positive confirmatory
test in an arbitration proceeding pursuant to a collective-bar-
gaining agreement and in state court proceedings if relevant.
Id. § 181.954(3). An employer may disclose the data both to
agencies of the federal government if federal law requires and
to a substance abuse treatment facility for the purpose of
evaluation or treatment. Id. Prosecutors may not use positive
results as evidence in a criminal proceeding against the em-
ployee or job applicant. Id. § 181.954(4).
The Act preserves the rights of parties to a collective-bar-
gaining agreement to agree on drug- and alcohol-testing policies
that meet or exceed the Act's minimum requirements. Id. §
181.954(5).
A civil action is available for statutory violations. Id. §
181.956(1), (2). Aggrieved employees may recover damages and
injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief. Id. § 181.956(3),
(4). The Act does not apply to employees and job applicants
subject to drug and alcohol testing pursuant to:
(1) federal regulations that specifically preempt state reg-
ulation of drug and alcohol testing... ;
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(2) federal regulations or requirements necessary to operate
federally regulated facilities;
(3) federal contracts where the drug and alcohol testing is
conducted for security, safety, or protection of sensitive or
proprietary data; or
(4) state agency rules that adopt federal regulations appli-
cable to the interstate component of a federally regulated
industry . . . for the purpose of conforming the nonfederally
regulated intrastate component of the industry to identical
regulation.
Id. § 181.957(1).
In Kise v. Product Design & Engineering, 453 N.W.2d 561
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that an employer could
require an employee to submit to drug testing after sustaining
a job-related injury and that the employee's refusal to submit
to the test constituted grounds for dismissal. Id. at 565. The
court stated that because the testing procedure was not arbi-
trary and because the employee had notice of the testing policy,
the discharge of the employee did not violate Minnesota law.
Id. at 566-67.
Mississippi
Handicap Discrimination
Mississippi's statutory handicap discrimination prohibition ap-
plies only to state employers or state-supported employers. Miss.
Code Ann. §§ 25-9-103, 25-9-149 (Supp. 1990); id. S 43-6-15 (1981).
The statute does not address alcohol or drug abuse or addiction,
see id., and no cases have been found that discuss the issue.
MISSOURI
Handicap Discrimination
The Missouri Human Rights Law, Mo. Ann. Stat. S§ 213.010-
.126 (Vernon Supp. 1991), forbids discrimination in employment
on the basis of an individual's handicap. Id. § 213.055. The Act
defines "handicap" as "a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activi-
ties, or a condition perceived as such, which with or without
reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing
the job." Id. § 213.010(8).
The statute does not address the issue of alcohol or drug use
or addiction. No Missouri cases have been found that address
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whether alcohol or drug use or addiction is a "handicap" within
the meaning of the Act.
Drug Testing
In Monroe v. Consolidated Freightways, 654 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.
Mo. 1987), the court held that private sector employees who
lost their jobs after refusing to take a drug test had no cause
of action under the Missouri Constitution's provisions protecting
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 662. For an
employee to prevail on a constitutional cause of action, state
action is required. Id. Additionally, the court found that the
employees had not stated a cause of action because the State
of Missouri does not recognize a wrongful discharge action based
on a public policy violation. Id. at 664. Even if the state recog-
nized such a cause of action under some circumstances, the court
opined that the employer's efforts to assure a drug-free working
environment would not contravene the public policy of Missouri.
Id.
MONTANA
Handicap Discrimination
Montana prohibits discrimination against a person because of
a physical handicap. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-303, -308 (1989).
The statute's definition of physical handicap does not expressly
exclude alcohol or drug abuse. Id. § 49-2-101(13), (16). The Mon-
tana Commission of Human Rights has opined that alcoholism
constitutes a protected handicap. In re tke Application of Am.
Indian Action Council, Case No. 288, Findings, Conclusions and
Order (Montana Commission of Human Rights, Oct. 1976). The
statute, however, does not specifically require an employer to
reasonably accommodate an individual with a physical handicap.
See Mont. Code Ann. 5 49-2-303(1)(a), (b). Furthermore, no dis-
crimination occurs if the nature or extent of the handicap
precludes performance of the particular employment or if the
particular employment subjects the handicapped person or his
coemployees to physical harm. Id.
The Montana Constitution provides a right of privacy to the
citizens of the state, Mont. Const. art. II, § 10, but the right of
privacy does not apply to purely private action. See Montana v.
Long, 700 P.2d 153, 157 (Mont. 1985) (denying defendants' motion
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to suppress evidence of marijuana plants discovered by their
landlord).
Drug Testing
Montana has a comprehensive statute regulating the testing
of blood and urine of employees and prospective employees. Mont.
Code Ann. S 39-2-304 (1989). Under the statute, an employer may
not require a prospective employee to submit to a blood or urine
test as a condition of employment, except for employment in
"hazardous work environments or in jobs [in which] the primary
responsibility is security, public safety, or fiduciary responsibil-
ity." Id. § 39-2-304(1)(b). An employer cannot require a current
employee to submit to a blood or urine test as a condition of
continuing employment "unless the employer has a reason to
believe that the employee's faculties are impaired on the job."
Id. S 39-2-304(1)(c).
Prior .to giving any drug or alcohol test, the employer must
adopt written drug-testing procedures and make them available
to all employees subject to testing. Id. S 39-2-304(2). These pro-
cedures must provide for:
(a) collection of a . . . specimen in a manner that minimizes
invasion of personal privacy;
(b) collection of a quantity of specimen sufficient to ensure the
administration of several tests;
(c) collection, storage and transportation in tamper-proof con-
tainers;
(d) adoption of chain-of-custody documentation. .
(e) verification of test results by two or more different testing
procedures ... ; and
(f) prohibition of the release of test results, except as authorized
by the person tested or as required by a court of law.
Id. S 39-2-304(2).
Employers must provide a copy of any test result to the
employee and allow the employee to obtain a confirmatory test
from an independent laboratory selected by the employee, all at
the employer's expense. Id. S 39-2-304(3). The employee must also
have an opportunity to rebut or explain positive test results. Id.
An employer may not take adverse action against an employee
who presents a reasonable explanation or a medical opinion
indicating that alcohol or drug consumption did not cause the
results of the test. Id. S 39-2-304(4). An employer violating the
statute is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. S 39-2-304(5).
1991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
NEBRASKA
Handicap Discrimination
Nebraska's Fair Employment Practice Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-
1101 to -1126 (1988), prohibits discrimination against any individual
in employment because of such individual's disability. Id. § 48-1104.
The term "disability" does not include a current alcohol or drug
user's addiction to alcohol or drugs. Id. § 48-1102(8). The Act thus
protects recovering alcoholics and addicts but allows employers to
discipline current users for their use. Id.
Drug Testing
Nebraska has passed a law "to help in the treatment and
elimination of drug and alcohol use and abuse in the workplace
while protecting the employee's rights." Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-
1901 to -1910 (1988). Although the Act gives the employer great
freedom to administer drug tests to current employees, it provides
that an employer may not use a positive result of a body fluid or
breath test in any disciplinary or administrative action or as a
basis for terminating employment, unless the result is "subse-
quently confirmed by gas chromatography-mass spectrometry or
other scientific testing technique which has been or may be ap-
proved by the [Department of Health]." Id. § 48-1903(1).
A positive finding of alcohol by preliminary screening proce-
dures is similarly subject to confirmatory testing. Id. § 48-1903(2).
If the confirmatory test results are negative, the employer must
rescind any disciplinary or administrative action. Id. "Except for
the confirmatory breath tests provided [for alcohol abuse], all
confirmatory tests shall be performed by a clinic, hospital, or
laboratory .. .licensed pursuant to the Federal Clinical Labora-
tories Improvement Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 263a, or which is
accredited by the College of American Pathologists." Id.
All specimens from positive tests shall be refrigerated and
preserved in a sufficient quantity for retesting for a period of at
least one hundred eighty days. Id. § 48-1904. The statute also
requires chain-of-custody documentation. Id. § 48-1905. An em-
ployer may not disclose test results to the public but must disclose
them to the employee upon request and may disclose them to
employees for purposes connected with their employment. Id.
48-1906.
An employer may discipline or discharge "any employee who
refuses the lawful directive of an employer to provide a body fluid
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or breath sample." Id. S 48-1910. Any employee who provides a
specimen or alters a specimen for purposes of altering the results
of any test "may be subject to the same discipline as if the
employee had refused the directive of the employer to provide a
[specimen]." Id. S 48-1909. The employee would also be guilty of a
Class I misdemeanor. Id.
NEVADA
Handicap Discrimination
The Nevada Statute on fair employment practices prohibits
discrimination by employers based on a "physical, aural or visual
handicap." Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 613.330 (Michie Supp. 1989). This
statute does not provide a definition of these handicaps and does
not expressly exclude alcohol or drug abusers from the protected
class of handicapped persons. See id.
Unemployment Compensation
In Fremont Hotel & Casino v. Esposito, 760 P.2d 122 (Nev. 1988),
the court held that an employee discharged after refusing to
submit to a drug and alcohol test contemplated by the collective-
bargaining agreement between his union and employer was not
entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at 124.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Handicap Discrimination
The New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination, N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. SS 354-A:1 to -A:14 (1984 & Supp. 1990), prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of physical or mental
handicap by private employers of six or more employees, unless
the discrimination is warranted by a bona fide occupational qual-
ification. Id. S§ 354-A:3(V), -A:8(I).
The statute defines "physical or mental disability" as a "disa-
bility other than illness, unrelated to a person's ability to perform
a particular job or position available to him for hire or for pro-
motion:' Id. S 354-A:3(XIII). The statute protects a disabled indi-
vidual from discrimination so long as he does not present a hazard
to himself or any other employee. Id. The statute does not indicate
whether drug addiction or other substance abuse would qualify as
a handicap. No reported cases interpreting this statute in the
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context of a substance-abuse-related discharge, refusal to hire, or
employer-testing program have been found.
Drug Testing
In O'Brien v. Papa Gino's, 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986), an
employee brought wrongful discharge and invasion of privacy
claims after he failed a polygraph test administered when his
employer learned that he was a substance abuser. In rejecting the
wrongful discharge claim, the court held that no New Hampshire
public policy protects an employee from taking an invasive poly-
graph test. Id. at 1071-73. The court found, however, that the
investigative techniques used by the employer were coercive,
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and were inva-
sive of plaintiff's privacy. Id. at 1072. These factors supported an
award for invasion of privacy. Id.
NEW JERSEY
Handicap Discrimination
New Jersey law prohibits discrimination against any person
who is or has been handicapped, unless the nature and extent of
the handicap reasonably preclude the performance of the partic-
ular employment. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-4.1 (Supp. 1990). The
statute defines "handicapped" as "suffering from physical disa-
bility, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement ... or from any
mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from
an anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological condi-
tion which prevents the normal exercise of bodily or mental
functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by
accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. 5 10:5-
5(q).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that alcoholism is a
handicap within the meaning of the statute because it may
manifest itself in either physical or psychological abnormalities.
Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 804 (N.J. 1988). The
reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Clowes applies
equally to drug addiction. See In re Cahill, 585 A.2d 977, 979
(N.J. 1991) (observing that, because alcohol is a drug, the reason-
ing in Clowes extends to drug addiction).
Drug Testing
The New Jersey Constitution's protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures provides greater protection than the Fourth
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Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Alston,
440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (N.J. 1981) (disallowing the search of an
automobile and the seizure of firearms found therein). A New
Jersey Superior Court held that "[pirivate action does not violate
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches[; t]hose
provisions limit the exercise of government power." Hennessey v.
Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170, 175 (N.J. Super. 1991).
In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d 430
(N.J. 1987), the court held that a city directive subjecting nar-
cotics officers to random drug testing "without probable cause
or reasonable individualized suspicion" violated the New Jersey
Constitution. Id. at 437-38 (citing N.J. Const. art. I, 7). In
contrast, the court in International Federation of Professional &
Technical Engineers v. Burlington County Bridge Commission, 572
A.2d 204 (N.J. Super.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 244 (N.J. 1990), held
that the state could require employees "physically involved in
the opening and closing of bridges" to submit to a drug test as
part of an annual physical exam. Id. at 205. The court distin-
guished the decision in Fraternal Order by emphasizing the direct
ffect on public safety and the lower expectation of privacy
resulting from drug tests at annual physical exams. Id. at 212.
A New Jersey Superior Court recently reversed a trial court's
opinion that public policy in New Jersey requires individualized,
reasonable suspicion prior to drug testing in the private work-
place. See Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170
(N.J. Super. 1991), rev'g No. W-003611-86, 1989 N.J. Super. LEXIS
474 (Apr. 28, 1989). In Hennessey, a former employee alleged that
his discharge in the wake of a random drug screen violated public
policy. Id. at 172. Although at-will employees in New Jersey have
a cause of action for wrongful discharge that is "'contrary to a
clear mandate of public policy,'" id. at 175 (quoting Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980)), a
constitutional prohibition that does not affect private action will
not suffice as evidence of a source of public policy in a private
employment context, see id. at 175.
NEW MEXICO
Handicap Discrimination
New Mexico's Human Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-1 to
-15 (1987), forbids discrimination in employment against any per-
son, otherwise qualified, because of a physical or mental handicap.
Id. 5 284-7. "Physical or mental handicap" means "a physical or
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mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an
individual's major life activities." Id. § 28-1-2(M). The statute also
defines an individual as handicapped "if he has a record of a
physical or mental handicap or is regarded as having a physical
or mental handicap." Id. An employer must accommodate an
employee's handicap "unless such accommodation is unreasonable
or an undue hardship." Id. § 28-1-7(J). No case law on the appli-
cation of the statutory definitions to alcohol or drug abuse or
addiction has been found.
NEW YORK
Handicap Discrimination
New York's Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290-301
(Consol. 1983 & Supp. 1990), makes it an unlawful discriminatory
practice for an employer to discharge, refuse to hire, or otherwise
discriminate against an individual "in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment" because of a "disability."
Id. S 296(1).
The Human Rights Law defines the term "disability" to mean:
(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which pre-
vents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demon-
strable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment or (c) a
condition regarded by others as such an impairment . ...
Id. § 292(21). A proviso to this definitional section limits the scope
of protection of the Human Rights Law to disabilities that do
not "prevent an individual from performing in a reasonable man-
ner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or
held." Id.
An employer may properly rely upon an employee's attendance
record in determining whether that employee has performed in
a reasonable manner. See Schmitt v. Kiley, 507 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908
(App. Div.) (holding that a petitioner's illness preventing him
from coming to work is not a "disability"), appeal denied, 511
N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1986); Silk v. Huck Installation & Equip. Div.,
486 N.Y.S.2d 406, 406-07 (App. Div. 1985) (determining that peti-
tioner's physical disability "prevent[ed] her from doing her job
in a reasonable manner since it caused her to miss an unaccept-
ably high number of days of work in a job that required consis-
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tently good attendance"). Accordingly, if an employee suffering
from alcoholism or drug abuse misses an unacceptable number
of workdays, an employer may discharge him without violating
New York's Human Rights Law.
Drug Testing
The Division of Human Rights takes the position that "an em-
ployer may not require a job applicant to submit to medical
examinations, including laboratory and psychological tests, unless
the examination is based upon a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion." New York State Division of Human Rights, Rulings on
Inquiries S 11(B) (1988). This prohibition specifically includes "test-
ing for drug and alcohol abuse" Inter-Office Memorandum from
Douglas H. White, Commissioner of the New York State Division
of Human Rights, to Albert J. Kostelny, Jr., Acting Chief Admin-
istrative Law Judge (Dec. 7, 1989) (copy on file with the William
and Mary Law Review). However, "where an employer has reason-
able cause to believe that an employee is taking drugs or abusing
alcohol while on the job, drug testing may be utilized and the
employer can consider and take further action based upon legiti-
mate business necessity depending upon the results of the test."
Id. (emphasis added). All other drug testing, according to the
Division, is prohibited unless it is tied to a bona fide occupational
qualification. Id.
In Burka v. New York City Transit Authority, 680 F. Supp. 590
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court held that the New York Human Rights
Law does not protect users of illegal narcotics unless they are
rehabilitated or rehabilitating drug users currently enrolled in a
treatment program. Id. at 600. Consequently, the employer's drug
testing to identify active narcotics users was not an impermissible
screening for handicaps and the termination decisions resulting
from test results were lawful. Id. at 610; see also Porcello v. General
Motors Corp., No. 3-E-D-85-103394, slip op. at 4-5 (Div. Human Rights
Jan. 18, 1990) (determining that a social or casual user of drugs is
not "disabled" within the meaning of the Human Rights Law).
In Doe v. Roe, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1989), affd, 553
N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1990), however, the New York County
Supreme Court found that an employer violated the Human Rights
Law by refusing to hire an applicant following a preemployment
urinalysis test that revealed the presence of opiates. The court
held that drug abuse alone cannot automatically disqualify a job
applicant or serve as a ground for termination as long as the
employee is able to reasonably perform his job. Id. at 878. An
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"automatic" dismissal, based solely on the positive test results,
violated the Human Rights Law. Id. The Division of Human Rights
concurred. Inter-Office Memorandum from Margarita Rosa, General
Counsel of the New York State Division of Human Rights, to
Barbara A. Riley, Deputy Commissioner for Regional Affairs, at 5-
6 (Oct. 28, 1987) (copy on file with the William and Mary Law
Review) (stating than an employee may not be discharged on the
basis of a drug test without regard for actual job performance).
The New York City Administrative Code prohibits employers
from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals based
on their physical or mental handicaps. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 8,
§ 8-108 (1985). An individual is deemed physically or mentally
handicapped when he "has or had a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, and
has a record of such an impairment." Id. § 8-102(16)(a). The Code
specifically provides that the term "physical or mental impair-
ment" includes alcoholism, substance abuse, and drug addiction.
Id. S 8-102(16)(b). The Code restricts the protection of section 8-
108 to those handicapped persons who "with reasonable accom-
modation can satisfy the essential requisites of the job . . . in
question." Id. § 8-102(16)(e).
The state constitution's equal protection and due process clauses,
as well as its protection from unreasonable searches and seizures,
apply only to state action and thus have no effect on activities of
private employers. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board
of Educ., 510 N.E.2d 325, 329 (N.Y. 1987); see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corp., 87 N.E.2d 541, 550-51 (N.Y. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
981 (1950).
The Court of Appeals of New York indicated that the require-
ments of the New York Constitution might be more strict than
those of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
See Patchogue-Medford, 510 N.E.2d at 328 (citing N.Y. Const. art.
1, § 1). The court in Patchogue held that the school board could
not order teachers to submit to drug tests without "reasonable
suspicion" and explained that "random searches conducted by the
State without reasonable suspicion are closely scrutinized, and
generally only permitted when the privacy interests implicated are
minimal, the government's interest is substantial, and safeguards
are provided to insure that the individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy is not subjected to unregulated discretion." Id. at 331
(citation omitted). In contrast, when police officers challenged their
department's plan to test narcotics officers randomly for drugs,
the court upheld the plan, stressing the diminished expectation of
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privacy and the dangerous effects of drug use on law enforcement.
Caruso v. Ward, 530 N.E.2d 850, 853-55 (N.Y. 1988).
Absent an agreement for a definite period of employment, the
courts presume employment relationships are at will. Sabetay v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 920 (N.Y. 1987). In Aikman v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 137 (App. Div. 1989), the
court determined that an employee who signed an agreement
making the at-will relationship explicit had no common law cause
of action to contest his employer's decision to discharge him for
failing a polygraph test given to determine his recent drug use.
Id. at 138. The court intimated that a drug- and substance-abuse
policy was reasonable. Id. The holding concerning the lie-detector
test has been preempted by statute. See N.Y. Lab. Law S 735
(Consol. 1983).
NORTH CAROLINA
Handicap Discrimination
The North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 143-422.1 to -422.3 (1990), and Handicapped Persons Pro-
tection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. SS 168A-1 to -12 (1987), prohibit dis-
crimination by private employers against individuals with handicaps
or with a "handicapping condition." See N.C. Gen. Stat. S 143-422.2
(1990); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-1 (1987). Although the latter Act
defines "handicapped" quite broadly, it specifically excludes from
that definition "active alcoholism or drug addiction or abuse." N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 168A-3(4)(aXfii}B). The Act, therefore, protects recov-
ering or rehabilitated addicts or alcoholics but not current users.
An employer that "manufactures, distributes, dispenses, conducts
research, stores, sells, or otherwise handles controlled substances
regulated by the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act" may
exercise its discretion as to employees or applicants currently using
drugs or with a history of drug abuse, without reference to the
prohibitions of the Handicapped Persons Protection Act. Id. S 168A-
5(bX2).
NORTH DAKOTA
Handicap Discrimination
The North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. Cent. Code SS 14-02.
4-01 to -21 (1989), prohibits discrimination in employment because
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of an individual's physical or mental handicap. Id. § 14-02.4-03. The
Act requires employers to reasonably accommodate otherwise qual-
ified individuals with a physical or mental handicap. Id. The Act
defines "handicap" as an "impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities" and "includes having a record of such
an impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. § 14-02.4-02(7). The statute does not address the issue of whether
alcohol or drug abuse or addiction is a protected handicap, and no
applicable cases have been found.
OHIO
Handicap Discrimination
Ohio's fair employment practices statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
4112.01-.99 (Anderson 1991), prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of an individual's handicap. Id. S 4112.02(A).
The statute defines "handicap" as "a medically diagnosable ab-
normal condition." Id. 5 4112.01(A)(13). The statute does not ex-
pressly define handicap to include alcohol or drug addiction. Id.
In Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio 1986),
the Ohio Supreme Court held that drug addiction and alcoholism
were "handicaps" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 479.
The court found that an employer who readily granted leaves
for temporary disabilities violated the statute by discharging the
plaintiff and denying him a leave of absence to obtain drug and
alcohol rehabilitation. Id. at 480. Under Hazlett, an employee can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) that
he has a drug or alcohol addiction; (2) that the employer's actions
were based in part on his handicapped status; and (3) that he
could safely and substantially perform the essential functions of
his job. Id.
The employee must present "medically qualified evidence to
support a finding" that he is an alcoholic. Greater Cleveland
Regional Transit Auth. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 567 N.E.2d
1325, 1327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). Even if an employee's handicap
would increase occupational hazards, the employee can still es-
tablish a case of discrimination by showing that the employer
could avoid these hazards with "reasonable accommodation." Id.
at 1329 (citing Ohio Admin. Code § 4112-5-08(D)(3)(c) (1990)). The
court held that requiring a second chance to complete an alcohol
treatment program constituted reasonable accommodations. Id.
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Drug Testing
An Ohio Court of Appeals stated that the cause of action for
invasion of privacy did not extend to drug testing. Groves v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 2-89-17, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
792, at *1041 (Feb. 22, 1991). Another Ohio Court of Appeals
decision, however, upheld unemployment benefits on an admin-
istrator's determination of unjust discharge for an employee's
refusing an unreasonable request to take a drug test. Clark v.
Buckey Rubber Prod., Inc., No. 1-89-76, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS
5276, at *5-6 (Nov. 14, 1990).
OKLAHOMA
Handicap Discrimination
Oklahoma's anti-discrimination law, Okla. Stat. tit. 25, SS 1101-
1901 (Supp. 1991), prohibits employers from discriminating
against any individual because of such individual's "handicap."
Id. § 1302(A)(1). A "handicapped person" is one "who has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, has a record of such
an impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. § 1301(4). The Oklahoma Human Rights Commission guide-
lines on employment discrimination explicitly adopt the defini-
tion of "handicapped person" used in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. 5§ 701-796i (1988). Oklahoma Human Rights
Commission, Interpretative Guidelines on Discrimination Against
the Handicapped, ch. IX, § A (1986).
That statute contains an exception to coverage for current
alcohol and drug abusers who are unable to perform their duties
or who constitute a threat to property or safety. 29 U.S.C.§ 706(8)(B). The Commission guidelines also outline an employer's
duty to reasonably accommodate applicants or employees with
handicaps. See Oklahoma Human Rights Commission, Interpre-
tative Guidelines on Discrimination Against the Handicapped,
ch. IX, § C (1986).
Unemployment Compensation
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that testing positive for
drug use is not, in itself, willful misconduct and thus does not
prevent a discharged employee from receiving unemployment
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benefits. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Logan, 789 P.2d 636,
639 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).
OREGON
Handicap Discrimination
Oregon's statutory law on civil rights for physically and men-
tally handicapped persons provides that "it is an unlawful em-
ployment practice for any employer to refuse to hire, employ
or promote, to bar or discharge from employment or to discrim-
inate in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment" because an individual "has a physical or mental
impairment which, with reasonable accommodation by the em-
ployer, does not prevent the performance of the work involved";
or because an individual has a record of, or is regarded as
having, a physical or mental impairment. Or. Rev. Stat.
5659.425(1)(a)-(c) (1989). The statute does not expressly exclude
alcoholics or other substance abusers from the protected class
of disabled persons.
Drug Testing
Oregon law mandates that only licensed clinical laboratories
conduct "tests, examinations or analyses on materials derived
from the human body for the purpose of detecting substances
of abuse in the body." Or. Rev. Stat. 438.435(1) (1989). Licensed
clinical laboratories may also accept samples from and report
results to employers and other nonmedical practitioners. Id.
§ 438.435(2). If an employer submits a sample to an out-of-state
laboratory, intending to use the results. to deprive or deny an
employee of employment or benefits, the employer has the
burden of showing that the testing procedure meets or exceeds
Oregon's testing standards. Id. § 438.435(6). Confirmatory tests
must be conducted on samples yielding positive results. Id.
438.435(3).
Oregon prohibits employers from requiring an employee or
prospective employee to take a breathalyzer test as a condition
of employment or continued employment unless the individual
consents to the test or the employer has "reasonable grounds
to believe that the individual is under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor." Id. SS 659.225, 659.227. "If [an] employer has
reasonable grounds to believe that [an] individual is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, the employer may require, as a
condition for employment or continuation of employment, the
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administration of a blood alcohol content test ... " Id.
659.225(1).
In Association of Western Pulp & Paper Workers v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 644 F. Supp. 183 (D. Or. 1986), the employer had
a drug- and alcohol-testing program that required testing of (1)
any employee reasonably suspected of being under the influence
of alcohol or illegal drugs and (2) any employee involved in an
on-the-job accident requiring significant medical attention. Id.
at 184. Employees who tested positive for illegal drugs or alcohol
were subject to discipline up to and including discharge. Id.
Employees who refused to submit to a drug test were also
subject to discipline. Id. The court held that because employees
were not subject to discipline for refusing alcohol testing unless
a supervisor had reasonable cause to believe that the employee
was under the influence, the program did not violate the breath-
alyzer statute. Id. at 186.
Unemployment Compensation
The Oregon Court of Appeals has determined that testing
positive for drugs is not willful misconduct that would disqualify
a discharged employee from receiving unemployment benefits
when the use is off-duty and the employer does not show on-
the-job impairment. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Employment Div., 804
P.2d 1183, 1185, 1187 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); Veneer v. Employment
Div., 804 P.2d 1174, 1180 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
PENNSYLVANIA
Handicap Discrimination
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 951-963 (1964 & Supp. 1990), prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of a "non-job related handicap or
disability." Id. S 955(a). The Act defines a "non-job related
handicap or disability" as "any handicap or disability which does
not substantially interfere with the ability to perform the es-
sential functions of the employment which a handicapped person
applies for, is engaged in, or has been engaged in." Id. S 954(p).
The regulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania Human Re-
lations Commission define a "handicapped or disabled person"
as one "who has a physical or mental impairment which sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activities; has a record
of such impairment; or is regarded as having such impairment."
16 Pa. Code § 44.1(i) (1979). The statute does not expressly
address drug or alcohol addiction.
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In Small v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 525 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987), a former meter reader sued her employer when she was
discharged after an arrest for drunk driving and subsequent
entrance into an alcohol detoxification program. The plaintiff
alleged her employer fired her because of her alcoholism in
violation of the handicap discrimination provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act. Id. at 425. The court stated that
although an employer's perception of an employee as alcoholic
could constitute a handicap, here the employer had discharged
the plaintiff because her arrest for drunk driving evidenced a
lack of dependability and responsibility, both of which were
essential to the proper performance of her job. Id. at 427.
Moreover, the employer convinced the court that because the
plaintiff did not demonstrate the classic signs of alcoholism, the
employer had never regarded her as an alcoholic. Id. The em-
ployee's discharge, therefore, did not constitute a violation of
the Human Relations Act. Id.
Drug Testing
A private employer may require its employees to submit to
drug testing. See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 758 F. Supp.
263, 267-68 (E.D. Pa. 1991). No cause of action exists when an
employer discharges an at-will employee except in "'the most
limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees
would threaten clear mandates of public policy.'" Hershberger
v. Jersey Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944, 946-47 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (quoting Clay v. Advanced Computer Application, 559 A.2d
917, 918 (Pa. 1989)). The District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania determined that a discharge for refusal to
consent to drug testing does not violate Pennsylvania's excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine. Borse, 758 F. Supp. at 265-67. Ad-
ditionally, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that public
policy does not require that an employer confirm a positive
drug test by an alternate method before terminating an em-
ployee. Hershberger, 575 A.2d at 947.
Unemployment Compensation
Denial of unemployment benefits on the basis of willful mis-
conduct is appropriate when the employee violates an employer's
established policy. See, e.g., Moore v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Bd. of Review, 578 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)
(involving refusal to submit to random drug test); Brunson v.
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Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 570 A.2d 1096, 1097
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (involving positive drug test).
PUERTO RIco
No statutes, regulations, or constitutional provisions of Puerto
Rico addressing drug or alcohol use, abuse, or addiction have
been found. Puerto Rico's Wrongful Discharge Statute, P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 29, S 185a (1985), is silent on the issue.
RHODE ISLAND
Handicap Discrimination
The Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 28-5-1 to -40 (1986 & Supp. 1990), prohibits job discrim-
ination on the basis of handicap by private employers of four
or more individuals. Id. S 28-5-6(2)(A). An employer must reason-
ably accommodate the handicap of an employee or applicant
"unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation
would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise
or business." Id. S 28-5-7(1)(D).
The Act defines "handicap" as "any physical or mental im-
pairment which substantially limits one or more major life
activities, a record of such impairment or [being] regarded as
having such an impairment." Id. S 28-5-6(7). A "physical or mental
impairment" includes "any physiological disorder or condition
• . . or any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities." Id. S 28-5-7(A). A "major life
activity" includes "functions such as caring for one's self, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, learning, and working." Id. S 28-
5-6(7)(B). The statute does not address whether alcoholism or
drug addiction are handicaps.
Another provision of the Rhode Island handicap statute, en-
titled Discrimination Against Handicapped, R.I. Gen. Laws 5 42-
87-1 (1988), provides that "no otherwise qualified handicapped
person shall solely by reason of his or her handicap, be subject
to discrimination by any person or entity doing business in the
state." Id. § 42-87-2. The definitions of pertinent terms are
almost identical to the definitions in the Rhode Island Fair
Employment Practices Act, see id. § 42-87-1, so their applications
to substance-dependent employees should be the same. No cases
addressing the issue have been found.
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Drug Testing
Rhode Island law prohibits an employer from subjecting any
employee to urine, blood, or other bodily fluid or tissue sampling
as a condition of continued employment without individualized
reasonable suspicion. R.I. Gen. Laws, S 28-6.5-1 to -2 (Supp.
1990).
An employer may require an employee to submit to substance
abuse testing as long as "the employer has reasonable grounds
to believe based on specific objective facts, that the employee's
use of controlled substances is impairing his or her ability to
perform his or her job." Id. S 28-6.5-1(A).
An employer must adhere to certain procedures in conducting
testing. The employer must permit the employee to provide the
sample "in private, outside the presence of any person." Id. 5 28-
6.5-1(B). The employer must conduct the testing "in conjunction
with a bona fide rehabilitation program." Id. 5 28-6.5-1(C). Positive
tests must be confirmed by scientifically recognized, accurate
methods. Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry is the method
of choice. Id. S 28-6.5-1(D). An employee must have an option of
having the sample tested at an independent facility at the em-
ployer's expense and a "reasonable opportunity to rebut or ex-
plain" positive test results. Id. S 28-6.5-1(E), (F).
An employer who improperly administers a test is guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by as much as $1000 fine, one year of
jail, or both. Id. § 28-6.5-1. A prevailing employee in a civil action
may recover actual and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs. Id. Injunctive relief is also available. Id.
SOUTH CAROLINA
Handicap Discrimination
In Prezzy v. Food Lion, Inc., 4 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA)
No. 996 (D.S.C. 1989), an employer discharged the plaintiff for
smoking marijuana on the job. Id. at 996. The court held that
because the employee handbook had a conspicuous disclaimer,
the plaintiff could not rely on its provisions in a breach of contract
action; moreover, the handbook specifically prohibited the use of
illegal drugs on the premises. Id. at 997.
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp.
1359 (D.S.C. 1985), an employee fired after testing positive for
marijuana use unsuccessfully sued his former employer for: (1)
wrongful termination; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
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and (4) invasion of privacy. The court found that the terms of a
policy manual were unenforceable because the manual did not
constitute a contract. Id. at 1362-63. It refused to imply a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing into an at-will employment rela-
tionship. Id. at 1363-64. The employer's actions were not sufficient
to give rise to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
id. at 1365-66, and the absence of public disclosure of private
facts or otherwise outrageous conduct was fatal to the invasion
of privacy claim, id. at 1370.
SOUTH DAKOTA
Handicap Discrimination
The South Dakota human rights law prohibits discrimination
against an employee because of that person's disability. S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. S 20-13-10 (1987). An employer must make
"good faith efforts" to reasonably accommodate the disabled
person unless the accommodation would impose undue hardship.
Id. § 20-13-23.7.
The statute defines "disability" as
any determinable physical or mental characteristic of an indi-
vidual or a history of the characteristic which may result from
disease, injury, congenital condition of birth or functional dis-
order which... is unrelated to an individual's ability to perform
the duties of a particular job or position, or is unrelated to an
individual's qualifications for employment or promotion.
Id. § 20-13-1(4). The statute does not indicate whether alcohol or
drug use or addiction would meet the definition of disability, and
no cases on this issue have been found.
TENNESSEE
Handicap Discriminaton
The Tennessee statute governing employment of the handi-
capped prohibits discrimination in "hiring, firing, or other terms
and conditions of employment" by any employer against any
employee based solely upon any physical, mental, or visual hand-
icap. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103(a) (1988). An exception is made
when the handicap "to some degree prevents the applicant from
performing the duties required by the employment sought or
impairs the performance of the work involved." Id. The definition
does not specifically exclude drug or alcohol addiction, and no case
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law that determines whether such addictions constitute "handi-
caps" under the statute has been found.
Drug Testing
Tennessee's drug-testing statute applies only to the authority
of the Commissioner of Corrections to require security personnel
employed by the Department of Corrections to submit to drug
tests. Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-1-122 (1990).
The Tennessee Constitution's due process clause and protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures do not apply to actions
by private employers. Ensor v. Rust Eng'g Co., 704 F. Supp. 808,
816 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
Unemployment Compensation
The refusal of an employee to obtain treatment for a drug abuse
problem constitutes "misconduct connected with work," disquali-
fying the employee from eligibility for unemployment compensation
benefits. Cherry v. Suburban Mfg. Co., 745 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tenn.
1988). Excessive absenteeism may also constitute misconduct, even
if the absenteeism is caused solely by the employee's alcoholism.
Miotke v. Kelley, 713 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
In Ivy v. Damon Clinical Laboratory, No. 41 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 20, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn file), an employer
temporarily suspended the plaintiff from his position as a bus
driver because of a positive drug test. The employee regained
his job after the results of a second test were negative. Id. He
then sued the laboratory that had performed the first test,
charging that it had caused "a slanderous, libelous and false
report to be published." Id. In finding for the defendants, the
court held that a qualified privilege applied to the clinic's publi-
cation of the test results to the employer, because the employer
had an interest in the results. Id. The laboratory did not abuse
the privilege because it did not know the results were inaccurate
and therefore did not act recklessly. Id.
TEXAS
Handicap Discrimination
Texas law prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis
of handicap and disability. Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.003
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(West 1990). The Texas handicap discrimination law defines a
"handicapped person" as "a person who has a mental or physical
handicap, including mental retardation, hardness of hearing, deaf-
ness, speech impairment, visual handicap, being crippled, or any
other health impairment which requires special ambulatory de-
vices or services." Id. § 121.002(4). The Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act defines "disability" as "a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activ-
ity or a record of such a mental or physical impairment." Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5221k, S 2.01(4) (West Supp. 1991). The
statute specifically excludes from the definition of "disabled" a
person currently addicted to the use of alcohol or drugs. Id.
5 2.01(4)(A).
Drug Testing
In Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1989), the court held that an employer's policy requiring
random urinalysis for evidence of illegal drug consumption was
lawful and enforceable. Id. at 502. The court refused to create a
public policy exception to at-will employment based upon the em-
ployee's privacy rights because the plaintiff employee's privacy
interest was not invaded without her consent. Id. at 501. She chose
to consent to the requirement that she give a urine sample, rather
than reject further employment with the company. Id. at 502.
Unemployment Compensation
In Texas Employment Commission v. Hughes Drilling Fluids,
746 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), the court held that an
employee's discharge for refusing to consent to random urinalysis
disqualified him from receiving unemployment benefits because
the refusal amounted to "misconduct." Id. at 803. There was no
violation of the employee's common law right of privacy, because
by continuing to work with full notice of the provisions of the
employer's drug-testing policy, the employee accepted the policy
as a condition of continued employment. Id. at 799-807. Likewise,
the statutory disqualification did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution because of the employee's
consent and the state's interest in eliminating drug abusers from
the private sector workplace. Id. at 800-01.
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UTAH
Handicap Discrimination
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-1
to -7.1 (1989 & Supp. 1990), prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment against any individual because of that individual's handicap.
Id. § 34-35-6. The Act defines "handicap" as "a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's
major life activities." Id. § 34-35-2(9). The Industrial Commission
of Utah has issued regulations that expand the statutory defini-
tion, but without referring to alcohol or drug abuse or addiction.
Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah's Anti-Discrimination Rules
(1991). The regulations require reasonable accommodation of all
handicapped individuals and set forth guidelines for determining
whether an accommodation poses an undue hardship on an em-
ployer's operation. Id. R486-1-2(J).
No cases have been found applying the statutory definition of
handicap to drug or alcohol abuse or addiction.
Drug Testing
Utah's drug- and alcohol-testing statute, Utah Code Ann. 5 34-
38-1 to -15 (1988), specifies procedures and guidelines for private
employers wishing to conduct drug and alcohol testing of em-
ployees and limits employer liability arising from such testing.
The statute permits an employer to test current or prospective
employees for the presence of drugs or alcohol as a condition of
hire or continued employment. Id. S 34-38-3. Management, how-
ever, also must submit to testing on a periodic basis. Id. An
employer may conduct tests for the following purposes: individual
employee impairment investigations; accident or theft investiga-
tions; safety procedures; or productivity, quality, or security
maintenance. Id. § 34-38-7.
The Act contains standards for collection and testing. Id.
34-38-5 to -7. The employer must pay all testing costs. Id. § 34-
38-5. Employee time spent on testing "shall be deemed work time
for purposes of compensation and benefits." Id.
Sample collections must occur "under reasonable and sanitary
conditions," with regard to individual privacy, and "in a manner
reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions" of samples or
other interference. Id. § 34-38-6(1)-(2). The procedures also include:
(1) labeling samples to preclude erroneous identification; (2) pro-
viding an opportunity for employees to notify the laboratory of
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any relevant information that might affect the outcome of the
test, "including identification of currently or recently used pre-
scription or nonprescription drugs"; (3) collecting, storing, and
transporting the samples "so as reasonably to preclude the prob-
ability of sample contamination or adulteration"; and (4) sample
testing which conforms to scientifically accepted methods, includ-
ing "verification or confirmation of any positive test result by
gas chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or
other comparably reliable analytical method." Id. § 34-38-6(3) to
(5). The statute also obligates employers to distribute a written
description of the testing policy to current and prospective em-
ployees. Id. § 34-38-7.
Upon receipt of a confirmed positive test result, or upon the
refusal of a current or prospective employee to provide a sample,
the employer may take action including the following:
(1) a requirement that the employee enroll in an employer-
approved rehabilitation, treatment, or counseling program,
which may include additional drug or alcohol testing, as a
condition of continued employment;
(2) suspension of the employee with or without pay for a
period of time;
(3) termination of employment;
(4) refusal to hire a prospective employee;
or
(5) other disciplinary measures in conformance with the em-
ployer's usual procedures, including any collective bargaining
agreement.
Id. § 34-38-8.
The statute also limits an employer's liability arising out of
the establishment of a drug- or alcohol-testing policy. See id. 5
34-38-10. A cause of action against an employer arises only when
an employer's action is based on a false test result. Id. A re-
buttable presumption that the test result is valid arises if the
employer has complied with the statute's collection and testing
provisions. Id. Therefore, if an employer has complied with the
statute, the employee must prove the violation. Moreover, the
employer is not liable for monetary damages if the employer's
''reliance on a false test result was reasonable and in good faith."
Id.
Unemployment Compensation
In Johnson v. Department of Employment Security, 782 P.2d
965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court held that an employee who
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tested positive for marijuana on both the post-accident and ran-
dom followup tests was discharged for just cause and ineligible
for unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at 972. The court
stated that "all employers and employees are entitled to a drug-
free workplace." Id. at 970.
VERMONT
Handicap Discrimination
The Vermont employment practices statute makes it an unlaw-
ful practice for an employer to discriminate against a "qualified
handicapped individual," except in the case of a bona fide occu-
pational qualification. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495 (1987). A "hand-
icapped individual" is one who: (1) "has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life
activities"; (2) "has a history or record of such an impairment";
or (3) "is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. 5 495d(5).
A handicapped individual is qualified if he is "capable of perform-
ing the essential functions of the job or jobs for which he is
being considered with reasonable accommodation to his handi-
cap." Id. 5 495d(6). No cases have been found addressing the
application of this definition to an alcohol- or drug-addicted em-
ployee or applicant.
Reasonable accommodation of an individual addicted to drugs
or alcohol may include job restructuring or part-time or modified
work schedules. See id. S 495d(12)(B). Factors to consider in de-
termining whether the requirement of reasonable accommodation
is unduly harsh include "the overall size of the employer's op-
eration with respect to the number of employees, the number
and type of facilities, . . . the size of budget[,] and . . . the cost
of the accommodation." Id. § 495d(12)(C)(i), (ii).
Drug Testing
Vermont law specifically regulates drug testing in the work-
place. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 511-520 (1987). An employer may
require a job applicant to submit to a drug test if all of the
following conditions are met: (1) the employer has extended an
offer conditioned on the applicant receiving a negative test result;
(2) the applicant has received written notice of the test at least
ten days prior to its administration; (3) the drug test is admin-
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istered during a comprehensive physical examination; and (4) the
drug test is administered pursuant to the procedures described
in the statute. Id. § 512.
The statute affords greater protection to current employees.
An employer may require a current employee to submit to a
drug test only if the employer or his agent "has probable cause
to believe the employee is using or is under the influence of a
drug on the job." Id. § 513(c)(1). Vermont law prohibits random
or company-wide drug tests unless federal law requires such
testing. Id. § 513(b). The employer must make available a bona
fide rehabilitation program for alcohol or drug abusers and may
not terminate an employee on the basis of a positive test result
if the employee successfully completes this employee assistance
program. Id. § 513(c)(2-(3). During the period of time necessary
to complete the program, the employer may suspend the em-
ployee from work "but in no event for longer than three months."
Id. § 513(c)(3). The employer may terminate an employee who
tests positive subsequent to completion of the program. Id.
The statute sets forth specific procedures for testing. Id. S 514.
An employer may test only for the presence of alcohol and drugs
that the United States Drug Enforcement Administration has
listed or classified as Schedule I drugs or that are likely to cause
impairment on the job. Id. § 511(3), 514(1). An employer must
provide employees with a written policy statement identifying
the circumstances under which the employer may require drug
tests, the particular test procedures, the drugs involved in the
screening, and the consequences of a positive test result. Id. §
514(2). An employer may only use a laboratory designated by the
Department of Health and must establish a chain-of-custody pro-
cedure for sample collection and testing. Id. S 514(4)-(5). If urinal-
ysis is used, confirmation tests must be performed, and, at the
time of testing, each individual must have the opportunity, at
his own request and expense, to have a blood sample drawn and
preserved for later testing. Id. § 514(6). Finally, an employee or
applicant must have an opportunity to explain the test results,
id. § 515(a), and any information concerning drug test results
must remain confidential, id. S 516(a), (b).
An aggrieved employee or applicant may seek injunctive relief,
damages, costs, and attorneys' fees in a civil action. Id. § 519(a).
In any action, the employer or laboratory has the burden of
proving that the procedure satisfied the statute's requirements.
Id. § 519(b). The statute also provides for criminal penalties. See
id. § 519(d).
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VIRGINIA
Handicap Discrimination
The Virginia Human Rights Act, Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-714 to -
725 (Michie 1987), prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of an individual's disability. Id. § 2.1-715. The Virginia
statute addressing persons with disabilities, Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-
1 to -46 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1990), also forbids discrimination
in employment against such persons. Under section 51.5-3, how-
ever, the definition of disability excludes active alcoholism or
current drug addiction.
Unemployment Compensation
To withhold unemployment benefits based on an employee's
misconduct, an employer must prove that the employee "'delib-
erately violate[d] a company rule.'" Barkley v. Peninsula Transp.
Dist. Comm'n, 398 S.E.2d 94, 95 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis
added) (quoting Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 249
S.E.2d 180, 182 (Va. 1978)). A bus driver's drug use constituted
a deliberate violation of the employer's policy against the use of
drugs both on- and off-duty. Id. at 95-96. A munitions factory
worker's positive drug test, however, did not establish a delib-
erate violation of a company policy against employees working
under the influence of drugs. Blake v. Hercules, Inc., 356 S.E.2d
453, 455-56 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
WASHINGTON
Handicap Discrimination
The Washington law against employment discrimination pro-
hibits discrimination based on an individual's "sensory, mental or
physical handicap." Wash. Rev. Code 49.60.180 (Supp. 1990).
"[F]or enforcement purposes a person will be considered to be
handicapped by a sensory, mental, or physical condition if he or
she is discriminated against because of the condition and the
condition is abnormal." Wash. Admin. Code S 162-22-040(1)(a) (1990).
This section states further that "'[t]he presence of a sensory,
mental, or physical handicap' includes, but is not limited to,
circumstances where a sensory, mental, or physical condition: (i)
is medically cognizable or diagnosable; (ii) exists as a record or
history; or (iii) is perceived to exist, whether or not it exists in
fact." Id. S (1)(b). Although the Washington Supreme Court held
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that "freedom from intoxication" can constitute a bona fide "oc-
cupational qualification," the court declined to address the ques-
tion whether alcohol abusers are within the protected class of
handicapped persons. Brady v. Daily World, 718 P.2d 785, 789
(Wash. 1986).
Drug Testing
Wash. Rev. Code section 49A4.120 (Supp. 1990) states that
[it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or the
state of Washington, its political subdivisions or municipal
corporations to require, directly or indirectly, that any em-
ployee or prospective employee take or be subjected to any
lie detector, or similar tests as a condition of employment or
continued employment.
The statute recognizes certain exceptions for jobs involving
law enforcement, handling of controlled substances, and na-
tional security.
Id.
The phrase "similar tests" might suggest an interpretation
that includes alcohol and drug testing. No state court cases or
administrative agency rulings addressing this issue have been
found. The Washington Supreme Court determined that Nuclear
Regulatory Commission rules preempted a state constitutional
law claim against drug testing at a nuclear power plant and
provided no guidance about the state constitution's potential
applications to drug testing in other circumstances. Alverado v.
Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427, 432, 436 (Wash.
1988).
WEST VIRGINIA
Handicap Discrimination
The West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code §§ 5-11-1
to -19 (1990), forbids discrimination in employment on the basis
of an individual's handicap "if the individual is able and competent
to perform the services required." Id. § 5-11-9(a)(1). Although the
Act defines the term "handicapped" broadly, it does not include
''persons whose current use of or addiction to alcohol or drugs
prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job
in question or whose employment, by reasons of such current
alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property
or the safety of others." Id. S 5-11-3(t).
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WISCONSIN
Handicap Discrimination
Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act, Wis. Stat. § 111.31-.395 (Supp.
1990), forbids discrimination in employment against any individual
on the basis of a handicap that is not "reasonably related to the
individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related re-
sponsibilities of that individual's employment." Id. § 111.34(2)(a);
see also id. § 111.321, 111.322(1). The statute defines "handi-
capped individual" as one who "[hias a physical or mental im-
pairment which makes achievement unusually difficult or limits
the capacity to work"; "[h]as a record of such an impairment"; or
"[ls perceived as having such an impairment." Id. S 111.32(8).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recognized alcoholism as a
handicap in Squires v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, 294
N.W.2d 48, 50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (holding discharge reasonable
because employee failed to perform job duties efficiently). To
show that alcoholism is a handicap, the employee must present
expert medical diagnosis that the employee's drinking "pro-
gressed to the stage where it was nonvolitional." Muth v. Labor
& Indus. Review Comm'n, No. 83-2303 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12,
1984) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file).
WYOMING
Handicap Discrimination
Wyoming's Fair Employment Practices Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-
9-101 to -108 (Supp. 1991), prohibits employers from discriminating
against a "qualified handicapped person." Id. § 27-9-105. A "qual-
ified handicapped person" is a "handicapped person who is ca-
pable of performing a particular job, or who would be capable of
performing a particular job with reasonable accommodation to
his handicap." Id. S 27-9-105(d). The Wyoming Fair Employment
Commission's Rules of Practice define a "handicapped person" as
"any person who has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record
of such impairment, or is regarded as having such an impair-
ment." Wyoming Fair Employment Commission, Rules of Practice
and Procedure ch. X, 5 3(a). "Physical or mental impairment" is
defined broadly, but no reference is made specifically to alcohol
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or drug abuse or addiction. Id. S 3(b). No case law applying these
standards to an alcohol or drug abuser or addict has been found.
Drug Testing
In Employment Security Commission v. Western Gas Processors,
786 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990), an employee who resigned rather than
face immediate dismissal for refusing to submit to a surprise
drug test sought unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at
869. The court rejected the employer's claim that the claimant
was discharged for misconduct and therefore ineligible for ben-
efits. Id. at 873. The court found that no corporate policy estab-
lished submission to testing as a condition of employment, and
an employer cannot reasonably rely on uncorroborated allegations
of drug use made by a hostile co-worker as the basis for de-
manding that an employee submit to testing. Id. at 872.
In Home v. J.W. Gibson Well Service Co., 894 F.2d 1194 (10th
Cir. 1990), the plaintiff, after two positive tests, was discharged
pursuant to a mandatory drug-testing policy. Id. at 1195. The
court held that the plaintiff was an at-will employee despite the
existence of the personnel policy that led to his termination. Id.
at 1195-96. Therefore, he could not state a claim for breach of
contract. Id. at 1196. The court affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in the defendant's favor on the plaintiff's claim for a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because: (1)
Wyoming does not recognize the claim in the employment context;
(2) the plaintiff received fair treatment; and (3) the employer had
a legitimate interest in a drug-free workplace. Id. The court also
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the employer's con-
duct did not violate public policy. Id.
In Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Wyo. 1987),
the plaintiff worked as a plant operation warehouseman in the
defendant's company. Id. at 1448. After refusing to submit to a
urinalysis test for drugs, he was terminated. Id. When the plain-
tiff had begun work, he had signed an employment contract
which stated that "[tihis contract may be terminated at any time
at the option of either the employer or the employee." Id. at
1449. Five months later, the company issued a policy stating
that:
[T]he use, possession, transportation, or sale of narcotics, illegal
drugs or drug paraphernalia by any employee while on duty,
while on Company premises or in any Company vehicle, or
while on any job site of a customer, is prohibited. During an
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investigation, unless prohibited by state statute, employees
may be requested to cooperate in urinalysis tests.... Employ-
ees may also be requested to cooperate in urinalysis and/or
blood tests on a spot check basis.
Id. The policy also indicated that refusal to submit to a test
would be cause for disciplinary action, including immediate dis-
charge. Id.
The court found that the contraband policy distributed to
employees did not change the at-will nature of the employment
relationship. Id. The policy did not set out procedures to follow
for discipline or discharge and did not create a right to a hearing
or an opportunity for the employee to rebut the charges of a
violation of company policy. Id. at 1449-50. Because the company
retained its complete discretion to discharge the employee, the
employment-at-will status of the employee remained unaltered.
Id. at 1450.
The court rejected the plaintiff's claims for wrongful discharge
and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. at 1450-51. The court held that even if Wyoming recognized
the tort of wrongful discharge for violation of public policy, the
company's attempt to maintain a drug-free environment was not
contrary to the public policy of Wyoming. Id. The court also
found that the employer had not breached an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing because it acted in good faith in
implementing and carrying out the drug-testing policy. Id.
In Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 741 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 1987), a
supervisor with twenty-one years of service was observed drink-
ing during duty hours. Id. at 118. The court declined to construe
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as requiring the
company to give the plaintiff a second chance before terminating
him. Id. at 119.
[Vol. 33:189
